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TAXING THE VICTIMS: COMPENSATORY
DAMAGE AWARDS AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAWSUITS
Marisa J. Mead*
INTRODUCTION
The prospect of recovering damages in sexual harassment
lawsuits should be encouraging to potential claimants.1 Prior to
1996, the federal income tax code furthered this goal by allowing
victims winning or settling lawsuits based on non-physical
personal injuries to exclude compensatory damage awards from
*Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.A., University of Delaware,
2001. The author wishes to thank her parents and sister for their constant love
and support. A special thanks to Scott M. Steel for always believing in me.
1
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003); Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003). Plaintiffs may sue and recover damages
for sexual harassment pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(the 1964 Act). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (prohibiting sex discrimination in
employment); see also infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing
the application of the Civil Rights Acts to sexual harassment law); infra Part
I.B (noting the types of damages that victims may recover in sexual
harassment lawsuits). Both men and women are presently entitled to sue for
sexual harassment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The number of women who are
affected by and prosecute for sexual harassment, however, is substantially
greater than the number of men. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY
1992-FY 2002, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2003). In 2001, women filed 86.3% of sexual harassment charges filed with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. Because sexual
harassment law is predominantly targeted toward the concerns of women, this
note specifically focuses on how women are influenced by the interaction
between sexual harassment law and federal tax policy.
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their gross income.2 In 1996, however, Congress added a
provision to the Small Business Job Protection Act3 making all
punitive and compensatory damages awarded for non-physical
injuries taxable income.4 Therefore, federal income tax may
significantly reduce or completely dissolve damages awarded to
non-physical injury victims.5 In extreme cases, these plaintiffs
may owe the government more money than they were originally
awarded to compensate for their injuries.6
Nevertheless, plaintiffs who receive compensatory damages
on account of physical personal injuries are not taxed on their
damage awards.7 Section 104(a) of the United States tax code
provides that victims receiving damages for non-physical injuries,
2

See Kristin Loiacono, Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way and Means,
TRIAL, Sept. 1, 2000, at 11 (reporting on the tax treatment of damage awards
received for physical and non-physical injuries). Section 61(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code defines gross income as “all income from whatever source
derived.” 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2003). Section 104(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code provided an exception to this for income derived from personal injury
damage awards received in settlements or lawsuits. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2)
(1995). Prior to 1996, § 104(a) did not distinguish between types of personal
injuries but, rather, excluded damages from any type of personal injury or
sickness. Id.
3
Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1775 (1996).
4
26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2003). See Loiacono, supra note 2, for discussion
of the implications of this provision.
5
Loiacono, supra note 2.
6
See Adam Liptak, Tax Bill Exceeds Award to Officer in Sex Bias Suit,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, at A18 (discussing the case of Cynthia C. Spina,
who won her sex discrimination case but was required to pay taxes in excess
of her damage award); infra Part III.B (illustrating the specifics of Ms. Spina’s
case). The tax consequences vary among plaintiffs, depending on a number of
factors such as the plaintiff’s gross income before the damage award, the
amount the plaintiff may be claiming as income tax deductions and the amount
of damages awarded to the plaintiff in the lawsuit. See infra Parts II.D and
III.B (discussing the different factors that determine the tax consequences for
different plaintiffs).
7
§ 104(a)(2). This is because the Internal Revenue Code still allows
victims of physical personal injuries to exclude their damage awards from the
calculation of gross income. Id.; see also Loiacono, supra note 2 (noting that
victims of personal physical injuries are treated preferentially, as opposed to
victims of non-physical injuries by the tax code). § 104(a)(2).
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including sexual harassment, must always pay income tax on
their awards while claimants recovering compensatory damages
for physical injuries are not required to do so.8 Because § 104(a)
creates expensive tax consequences for plaintiffs receiving
damage awards in non-physical injury cases,9 many sexual
harassment victims are being deterred from commencing lawsuits
against their employers.10
This note argues that the unreasonable distinction between
damages flowing from physical personal injuries and those from
non-physical personal injuries is not simply a monetary burden—
it also hinders the progress the United States has made in
recognizing sexual harassment as a serious problem.11 Part I of
this note provides background information about the development
of sexual harassment law and how sexual harassment became a
compensable injury as a form of employment discrimination. Part
II explains the history and current status of the taxation of
damage awards in the United States pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §
104(a). Part III examines the economical, social and legal
consequences of § 104(a)’s system of “taxing the victims.”

8

§ 104(a)(2). All damages relating to physical injuries, except for
punitive damages, are exempt from income taxation, while all damages
relating to non-physical injuries, both compensatory and punitive, are not
exempt from taxation. Id.; see Marcia Coyle, Bill to Remove Tax on Awards
May See Action, 228 N.Y. L.J. 33 (2002) (arguing that the tax treatment of
physical and non-physical injuries is a distinction without reason).
9
Loiacono, supra note 2. See also Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen,
Discrimination Against Damages for Unlawful Discrimination: The Supreme
Court, Congress, and the Income Tax, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447 (1998)
(criticizing the distinction between lost wages in physical injury cases and back
pay awarded in employment discrimination cases).
10
See Liptak, supra note 6 (reporting that there is less of an incentive to
commence a lawsuit based on employment discrimination because of the tax
burdens created by § 104(a)). Section 104(a) applies to all non-physical
injuries and, thus, to all forms of employment discrimination. § 104(a)(2).
This note focuses on sexual harassment claims to provide a specific example
of the effect current tax policy has on a particular area of anti-discrimination
law.
11
See infra Part I.A (discussing the development of the law in
recognizing sexual harassment as a compensable injury).
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Specifically, the tax code deters victims of sexual harassment
from reporting their claims, insinuates that their injuries are not
“real” and creates a contradictory legal policy.12 Finally, Part IV
discusses conceivable future improvements to the tax code that
would correct the negative effects of this tax policy.
I.

BACKGROUND OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW

The significance of taxing non-physical injury damage awards
in sexual harassment lawsuits is best appreciated by
understanding the foundations of sexual harassment law.13 Today,
through the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,14 the
law “recognizes that unwanted, demeaning, or threatening sexual
conduct can limit women’s opportunities, ambitions, and rewards
in workplaces and schools.”15 The legislature, however, did not
always provide victims of sexual harassment adequate remedies.16
In fact, it was not until the Civil Rights Act was amended in 1991
that sexual harassment plaintiffs were entitled to the full range of
damages available today in all employment discrimination

12

See Karen B. Brown, Not Color or Gender Neutral: New Tax
Treatment of Employment Discrimination Damages, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 223, 256-58 (1998) (arguing that § 104(a) was enacted partly
because of Congress’s intention to discount the importance of job bias
injuries); Sager & Cohen, supra note 9, at 502 (arguing that heightened
sympathy for victims of physical injuries does not justify a tax exclusion
favoring physical injury victims over non-physical injury victims); Mark J.
Wolff, Sex, Race, and Age: Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 78
WASH. U.L.Q. 1341, 1485 (2000) (stating that employment discrimination
victims suffer substantial injuries and are entitled to the § 104(a) tax exclusion
just as much as victims of physical injuries).
13
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003).
14
Id.
15
GWENDOLYN MINK, HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLITICAL
BETRAYAL OF SEXUALLY HARASSED WOMEN 3 (2000) (arguing that although
there is currently a statutory basis for relief for sexual harassment victims,
those victims are still socially and politically demeaned).
16
Id. at 24. See infra Part I.A (discussing the development of sexual
harassment law and available remedies).

MEADMACROX.DOC

6/25/03 5:28 PM

TAXING SEXUAL HARASSMENT

805

cases.17
A. Development of Sexual Harassment Law
By prohibiting sex discrimination in employment, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first statute to provide relief
to women who experienced sexual harassment.18 Title VII states
that it is an “unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”19 The text of Title VII does not specifically mention
“sexual harassment,” and victims first had to persuade courts that
sexual harassment constituted discrimination on the basis of sex.20
Initially, courts were not receptive.21 In 1974, the first claim of

17

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003); see also MINK, supra note 15, at 24. Prior
to the 1964 Act, victims of sex discrimination, and therefore sexual
harassment, had no federal statutory recourse. Id.
19
42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The 1964 Act only prohibited racial discrimination
in employment when it was first introduced to Congress. 110 CONG. REC.
H2577-84 (1964). The prohibition of sex discrimination in employment was
added during the congressional debates on the bill. Id. In fact, it is believed
that members of Congress opposed to the passage of the Civil Rights Act
actually included the prohibition on sex discrimination in employment to help
defeat the passage of the bill. Stephanie Schaeffer, Sexual Harassment
Damages and Remedies, 73 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 § 6 (1999).
20
MINK, supra note 15, at 24; Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 6. Plaintiffs
asked the courts to recognize that sexual harassment was an “unlawful
employment practice . . . because of . . . sex,” as prohibited by Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2003).
21
MINK, supra note 15, at 24; see Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390
F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975) (holding that plaintiffs subjected to sexual
advances by their supervisor had not been discriminated on the basis of their
sex); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C. 1974),
available at 1974 WL 10528 (ruling that plaintiff’s assertion of sexual
harassment was not discrimination on account of sex), rev’d sub nom. Barnes
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
18
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sex discrimination based on sexual harassment was dismissed.22
The court explained that the woman had been discriminated
against not because she was a woman, but because of her refusal
to engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor.23 The following
year, another court denied two women relief under Title VII,
finding it was “ludicrous” to hold that the activity involved
constituted sex discrimination in employment.24 The court
reasoned that the alleged sexual advances made by the supervisor
were merely attributed to his “personal urge,” without any
relation to a discriminatory policy of the employer.25 Therefore,
the court found that his actions could not constitute sex
discrimination in employment. 26
It was not until 1976, in Williams v. Saxbe, that a court ruled
22

Barnes, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 123.
Id. Paulette Barnes alleged that her supervisor at the Environmental
Protection Agency had asked her to begin an affair and told her that doing so
would improve her employment position. Id. She declined, and was eventually
fired. Id. The court found against her, maintaining that this was a “personal
controversy underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmonious personal
relationship.” Id.
24
Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). In
Corne, two plaintiffs, Jane Corne and Geneva DeVane, alleged that they had
been repeatedly subjected to verbal and physical advances from their
supervisor, Leon Price. Id. They also stated that because they did not want to
cooperate with Mr. Price, they resigned from their positions as clerical
workers. Id. Therefore, they argued that they had been subjected to a sex
discriminatory condition of employment. Id. See MINK, supra note 15, at 25
(discussing Corne).
25
Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 162. The court stated:
Mr. Price’s conduct appears to be nothing more than a personal
proclivity, peculiarity, or mannerism. By his alleged sexual advances,
Mr. Price was satisfying a personal urge. Certainly no employer
policy is here involved; rather than the company being benefited in
any way by the conduct of Price, it is obvious that it can only be
damaged by the very nature of the acts complained of. Nothing in the
complaint alleges nor can it be construed that the conduct complained
of was company directed policy which deprived women of
employment opportunities.
Id. at 163.
26
Id.
23
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in favor of a sexual harassment plaintiff.27 The claimant, Diane
Williams, alleged that she was humiliated and fired after rejecting
sexual advances from her supervisor.28 The District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that she had demonstrated
discrimination based on her sex pursuant to Title VII.29 The
defendant argued that sex discrimination was not demonstrated
because there had been no gender stereotyping but, rather, the
plaintiff was fired for refusing to accept her supervisor’s sexual
advances.30 The court stated that this argument was “an
erroneous analysis of the concept of sex discrimination as found
in Title VII . . . .”31 To the contrary, the court found that
Congress intended broad construction of Title VII to include a
discrimination claim based on a “rule, regulation, practice or
policy . . . applied on the basis of gender,” even if it did not
arise out of an employer’s “well-recognized sex stereotype.”32
After Williams, courts commonly accepted Title VII sexual
harassment claims,33 making Title VII the main basis of relief for
27

Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D. D.C. 1976).
Id. at 655. Ms. Williams alleged that after she refused the sexual
advance of her supervisor, Mr. Brinson, he continued to harass and humiliate
her by, among other things, giving her unwarranted reprimands for her job
performance. Id. at 655-56. After investigating her allegations, the EEOC
informed Ms. Williams that a “finding of no discrimination was proposed.”
Id. at 656. At an administrative hearing, the complaints examiner found no
discrimination on the basis of sex because “the evidence did not establish ‘any
causal relationship’ between her rejection of Mr. Brinson and his subsequent
treatment of her and her ultimate termination.” Id. Ms. Williams then sued in
the District Court for the District of Columbia to recover damages under Title
VII. Id. at 655.
29
Id. at 657-58.
30
Id. at 657.
31
Id. at 658.
32
Id.
33
MINK, supra note 15, at 48. Both Barnes and Corne were eventually
overturned so that the plaintiffs were allowed to pursue their sexual
harassment claims under Title VII. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.
1977), rev’g Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123 (D.D.C.
1974), available at 1974 WL 10528; Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 19
Empl. Prac. Dec. P9181 (D. Ariz. 1978), available at 1978 WL 205, rev’g
390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). There is still some debate over whether
28
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victims of sexual harassment.34
In 1980, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), a federal agency created pursuant to § 705
of Title VII, published guidelines for employers to demonstrate
preventive measures employers should take to eliminate sexual
harassment in the workplace.35 In addition, the EEOC guidelines
same-gender sexual harassment qualifies as discrimination on the basis of sex.
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (ruling
that same sex harassment is actionable); Debra L. Raskin, Sexual Harassment
in Employment, SG 083 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 691, 729 (2000) (providing a general
discussion about the development of same-gender sexual harassment case law).
34
Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 6. Plaintiffs may also sue for sexual
harassment under several other federal statutes. Debra L. Raskin, Sexual
Harassment in Employment, Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights
Actions in Federal and State Courts, SG083 A.L.R.-A.B.A. 691, 799 (2002).
For instance, plaintiffs may sue pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986 for
conspiracy to deprive them of their legal rights. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986
(2003); see Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 166 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding that women are protected by § 1985 from conspiracies of sex
discrimination); Palace v. Deaver, 838 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(allowing assertion of conspiracy to sexually harass plaintiff in order to deny
her equal protection rights). Plaintiffs may also sue under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2003); see Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (ruling in favor of a plaintiff
asserting a Title IX sexual harassment case against a public school).
In addition, most states now have anti-discrimination statutes that entitle
women to sue for sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination. See
Debra S. Katz & Alan R. Kabat, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, SH039
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1111 (2002) (giving an overview of current sexual harassment
law). Alabama is the only state that does not have a race or sex discrimination
law. Id. at 1235. See, e.g., California Fair Employment and Housing Act,
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900-96 (2003); New York Human Rights Law, N.Y.
EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (2001); see Katz & Kabat, supra at 1235 (providing a
complete list of all state anti-discrimination law citations).
35
JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 17, 409 (5th ed.
2001) (discussing the creation and purposes of the EEOC); MINK, supra note
15, at 24 (discussing the role of the EEOC in the development of sexual
harassment law). The guidelines were first published on November 10, 1980.
ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2.8 (2d ed. 1994) (describing the use of EEOC guidelines in the
law of sexual harassment).
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included definitions of sexual harassment to help victims
recognize and pursue their claims.36 The EEOC guidelines define
sexual harassment as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3)
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual’s work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.37
The EEOC is authorized to enforce federal anti36

FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 409. Although these
guidelines are not binding on the courts, they are a guide for what constitutes
actionable sexual harassment, and many courts still refer to them in making
rulings on sexual harassment claims. Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 14 (1999)
(providing an overview of the EEOC guidelines stating what is actionable
sexual harassment); see, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 6566 (1986) (approving and relying on the EEOC guidelines in making its
decision). “The Commission has applied the Guidelines in its enforcement
litigation, and many lower courts have relied on the Guidelines.” U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Enforcement Activities, Dec. 4,
2002
[hereinafter
EEOC
Enforcement
Activities],
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/enforce.html.
37
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2003). Employers are held liable for acts of
sexual harassment committed by their employees. § 1604.11(d). The EEOC
guidelines state, “With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an
employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where
the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action.” Id. In addition, an employee may hold an
employer liable for harassment caused by a non-employee if the employer (or
its agents or supervisory employees) knew or “should have known of the
conduct and fail[ed] to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” §
1604.11(e). These policies provide an incentive for employers to implement
programs encouraging sexual harassment prevention. FRIEDMAN &
STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 409.
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discrimination laws by receiving complaints from employees who
believe they have suffered employment discrimination.38 Before
suing in federal court for a violation of employment
discrimination laws, potential plaintiffs must first file a complaint
with the EEOC.39 If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe
that the discrimination has occurred, it attempts to reach a
resolution between the individual filing the charge and the
responding employer.40 The EEOC may also file lawsuits in
federal court on behalf of employees who believe they have been
discriminated against or allow the charging party to file an action
in court without further EEOC involvement.41
The Supreme Court decided its first sexual harassment case,
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in accordance with the EEOC
guidelines.42 The Court explicitly acknowledged the EEOC
definition of sexual harassment, ruling that employers can be
liable for two types of harassment: quid pro quo harassment and
harassment that creates a hostile work environment.43 Quid pro
38

FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 409. See also EEOC
Enforcement Activities, supra note 36.
39
FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 35, at 409.
40
EEOC Enforcement Activities, supra note 36. All charges the EEOC
receives are classified into three categories: “Category A” includes charges
that are given priority in investigation efforts and settlement efforts “due to the
early recognition that discrimination has likely occurred; “Category B”
includes charges that require further investigation to determine whether
discrimination has occurred; “Category C” includes charges that are
unsupported or non-jurisdictional and are closed immediately. Id.
41
Id. In 1972, the federal government authorized the EEOC to file
lawsuits on behalf of workers. KAREN J. MASCHKE, LITIGATION, COURTS,
AND WOMEN WORKERS 3 (1989) (providing the history of sex discrimination
in employment and the judicial response to such claims). Parties may
voluntarily participate in the EEOC’s alternative dispute resolution program,
where a neutral mediator assists in confidentially resolving discrimination
issues between parties. EEOC Enforcement Activities, supra note 36. The
EEOC may also file lawsuits on behalf of employees in “egregious”
discrimination cases or file amicus curiae briefs to support EEOC positions.
Id.
42
477 U.S. 57 (1986); see Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 7 (discussing
the impact of Meritor on the law of sexual harassment).
43
Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 14. If liability is proven, the same types
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quo harassment occurs when an employment benefit has been
conditioned, implicitly or explicitly, on an employee’s
compliance with an unwelcome sexual activity.44 On the other
hand, hostile environment sexual harassment involves unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature in the workplace.45 According
to Meritor, hostile work environment sexual harassment is
actionable when it is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter

of remedies are usually available for both types of sexual harassment cases,
depending on the circumstances of each individual case. 42 U.S.C. §2000e5(g) (2003). “If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged
in . . . an unlawful employment practice . . . , the court may . . . order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate . . . or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate.” Id. “In an action brought by a complaining
party under [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5] against a respondent who engaged in
unlawful intentional discrimination . . . the complaining party may recover
compensatory and punitive damages . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2003).
Federal district courts have discretion over which remedies will be available to
plaintiffs on a case by case basis. Id.; Schaeffer, supra note 19, at §14.
44
MINK, supra note 15, at 50. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1979) (finding quid pro quo harassment where the plaintiff was fired
after refusing supervisor’s sexual advances); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp.
654 (D.D.C. 1976) (finding sexual harassment where the plaintiff was
discharged after refusing her supervisor’s sexual advances).
45
LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE 3 (Matthew B. Schiff &
Linda C. Kramer eds., 2d ed. 2000) (providing an overview of sexual
harassment litigation tactics and information for claimants). See e.g., Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment
occurred where the plaintiff was subject to many unwelcome sexual advances
and was even raped on several occasions); Katz v. Doyle, 709 F.2d 251 (4th
Cir. 1983) (finding sexual harassment where the plaintiff endured sexual slurs,
insults and other offensive verbal harassment in the workplace); Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that sexual
harassment occurred where an employee was subjected to demands for sexual
relations from her supervisor and sexual language on numerous occasions).
Catherine MacKinnon originally asserted the idea that hostile environment
should be a recognizable form of sexual harassment. See generally,
CATHERINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF THE WORKING WOMAN:
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). MacKinnon declared that quid pro
quo harassment was not the only type of harassment that could violate Title
VII. Id. at 2, 40.
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the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive
working environment.’”46
B. Damages Under Sexual Harassment Law
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, only back pay,
injunctions and other forms of equitable relief were available to
prevailing sexual harassment plaintiffs under Title VII.47 The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act) changed this result—
presently, a plaintiff can be awarded many types of damages:
reinstatement, back pay, front pay, compensatory and punitive
damages, attorneys’ fees and costs and pre-judgment interest.48
The 1991 Act defines compensatory damages as including “future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience,
mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.”49 The 1991 Act’s expansion of available
46

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). This severity requirement was satisfied in Meritor.
Id. Vinson described a situation where her supervisor made repeated requests
for sexual favors while at work, fondled her in front of other employees,
followed her into the women’s restroom and exposed himself to her and raped
her on several occasions. Id. at 60.
47
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2003). See Deborah F. Buckman, Award of
Compensatory Damages Under 42 U.S.C.A. §1981A for Violation of Title VII
of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 154 A.L.R. FED. 347, § 2 (1999) (discussing the
expansion of available remedies under Title VII throughout the years).
48
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003). See Buckman, supra note 47, at § 2;
Schaeffer, supra note 19, at §§ 16-17. Pre-judgment interest is normally
awarded on back pay and compensatory damages and accrues from the date
the plaintiff was terminated until the date the plaintiff receives a judgment in a
lawsuit for sexual harassment. Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 26. An award of
pre-judgment interest ensures that the plaintiff is fully compensated for her
economic losses. Id. The 1991 Act states that “[a] complaining party may
recover punitive damages . . . if the complaining party demonstrates that the
respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices
with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2003).
49
§ 1981a(b)(3). Compensable pecuniary losses may include, but are not
limited to, back pay and front pay. LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CASE, supra note 45, at 24. Back pay compensates plaintiffs for the wages
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damages evidenced congressional recognition that victims of sex
discrimination deserve compensation for all of their resultant
harms.50
According to the 1991 Act, employers may be liable for
compensatory and punitive damages up to $300,000 per plaintiff,
depending upon the size of the employer’s work force.51
they would have earned had they not been discriminated against, while frontpay awards for future lost earnings. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 15 F.
Supp. 2d 1364, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1998). Basically, front pay compensates the
victim for wages she loses while she is looking for employment comparable to
the employment she would hold but for the discrimination. Id. Therefore,
front pay is usually only awarded when it would be impracticable for the court
to require the reinstatement or re-hiring of the victim. Id. at 1378-80. In
addition, plaintiffs may also seek compensatory damages for other pecuniary
losses such as moving expenses, job search expenses, medical expenses,
physical therapy and other expenses reasonably incurred as a result of the
discriminatory conduct. LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE, supra
note 45, at 447.
50
See, e.g., Williams v. Pharmacia Opthalmics, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 791,
794 (N.D. Ind. 1996), aff’d, 137 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1998) (ruling that a sex
discrimination plaintiff’s award of $1,250,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages be reduced only as far as the statutory maximum of $300,000
because “compensation is the primary purpose of the new remedies provided
by the 1991 Act”); see infra Part III.C and note 221 (describing the types of
harms caused by sexual harassment). The plaintiff, Evelyn Williams, won her
lawsuit based on the allegations that she had not been considered for a
promotion and was later terminated because of her sex. Williams, 926 F.
Supp. at 794. The court of appeals, struck down her punitive damage award
but upheld her compensatory damage award. Id.
51
42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3) (2003). Under the 1991 law, damages are
capped according to the number of employees working for the employer found
liable for the harassment: an employer with between 15 and 100 employees
can be liable for no more than $50,000; for an employer with 101 to 200
employees, damages are capped at $100,000; for an employer with 201 to 500
employees, the cap is $200,000; for an employer with more than 500
employees, the cap is $300,000. Id. Because the cap applies to the amount of
damages each plaintiff may recover from an employer, however, an employer
might have to pay $300,000 to each plaintiff suing that employer for the same
sexual harassment claim. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (stating “damages awarded
under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party . . .
$300,000”). On the other hand, just because a single plaintiff brings several
different sex discrimination claims does not mean the plaintiff may recover
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Therefore, when a jury awards more than $300,000 to a sexual
harassment plaintiff, the judge must reduce the award to what she
deems an appropriate amount pursuant to the damage cap
provision.52 After compensatory and punitive damage awards are
granted, the court may also award attorneys’ fees and costs to
compensate a successful plaintiff for the expense of bringing the
action.53 There are two general reasons why attorneys’ fees are
$300,000 in damages for each one of her claims. Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d
1193 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 64, L. Ed. 2d 50 (U.S. 1998)
(holding that sex discrimination and retaliation plaintiff could not recover the
statutory maximum on each of her asserted claims but, rather, could only
recover the statutory maximum once to compensate for all her claims
combined). When plaintiffs request punitive or compensatory damages the
court is not to inform the jury of the statutory caps put on damage awards. 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2003). This requirement enables the jury to make its own
determination of appropriate damages based on the facts of the case without
any influence from the monetary limits of the statute. See Buckman, supra
note 47, at § 5 (discussing the expansion of available damages under Title VII
and the statutory cap on those damages).
52
42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(3) (2003). When a jury award is excessive, the
trial judge has discretion on how far to reduce the award below the damage
cap. Schaeffer, supra note 19, at § 31. Therefore, courts differ on whether to
reduce excessive awards to the statutory maximum or below the statutory
maximum. See, e.g., Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997)
(upholding the trial judge’s reduction of an award to no lower than the
statutory maximum of $300,000, where the plaintiff was awarded more than
$5 million in punitive and compensatory damages). But see Hennessy v. Penril
Datacomm Networks, 69 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that when the
jury awards punitive damages in excess of the statutory cap, under certain
circumstances, the award may be reduced to an amount below the statutory
maximum).
53
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2003). See also Schaeffer, supra note 19, at §
35; CONTE, supra note 35, at §6.55. Title VII states that “the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the
costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the
same as a private person.” § 2000e-5(k). The use of “the Commission” refers
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See supra text
accompanying notes 35-41 (describing the purposes of the EEOC). If the
plaintiff loses her lawsuit and the employer prevails, the prevailing employer
may only recover attorneys’ fees if the court finds that the “plaintiff’s action
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought
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recoverable pursuant to Title VII. First, compensation for
litigation expenses is the last step in restoring the plaintiff to the
position she would have been in if the harassment had not taken
place.54 Second, there would be less of an incentive to file sexual
harassment lawsuits if plaintiffs had to bear the costs of hiring
attorneys and pursuing their claims.55 Courts have broadly
construed the provision of Title VII allowing recovery of
attorneys’ fees to fully compensate victims for their injuries and
encourage victims to vindicate their civil rights.56
II. TAXATION OF DAMAGE AWARDS
Historically, the United States tax code excluded personal
injury damage awards from income taxation.57 Through the Small
Business Job Protection Act, however, Congress significantly
narrowed this exclusion.58 Just five years after expanding
damages available under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress
amended the tax code to limit the exclusion to damages received
on account of physical personal injuries.59 In addition, the

in subjective bad faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,
421 (1978).
54
LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE, supra note 45, at 496.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 496; see Brandau v. Kansas, 168 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1808, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (U.S. 1999) (holding that
an award of nominal damages in a hostile work environment case entitled the
plaintiff to recover attorneys’ fees from defendant); see also CONTE, supra
note 35, at § 6.55.
57
26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1995); F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole
Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Tort Damages for
Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725, 726 (1997).
58
Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat.
1755 (1996); see infra Part I.C (discussing the implications of the Small
Business Job Protection Act’s amendment to the tax code).
59
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §
1981(a) (2003). See supra Part I.B (discussing the expansion of remedies
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also infra text accompanying
notes 102-04 (discussing the taxation of non-physical injury damage awards in
light of the expansion of remedies).
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distinction between physical and non-physical injuries generated
disagreement among circuit courts about the tax treatment of
attorneys’ fees awarded in non-physical injury cases.60
A. Personal Injury Taxation
The taxation of damages has undergone many changes since
the federal income taxation program was first adopted in 1913.61
As early as 1918, damage recoveries for personal injuries were
excluded from the calculation of gross income, regardless of the
type of injury.62 Two major theories developed on why Congress
excluded all personal injury damage recoveries.63 The first notion
is that damage awards for personal injuries are not “income” per
se; therefore, they should not be taxed as “income.”64 This
theory derives from the historically accepted common law
definition of “income.”65 For taxation purposes, income is “a
gain that adds to the capital already owned by the person.”66 If
damage awards compensate individuals for losses caused by
personal injuries, they cannot constitute “gains” in capital

60

See infra Part II.D and text accompanying notes 140-42 (discussing the
split among circuits on how to treat contingent attorneys’ fee awards).
61
U.S. Const. Amend. XVI. “The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived . . . .” Id.; Hubbard,
supra note 57, at 732.
62
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254 § 213(b)(6), 20 Stat. 1057,
1066 (1919); Hubbard, supra note 57, at 741. Thus, at that time, damage
awards based on non-physical personal injuries received the same tax
treatment as those for physical personal injuries. 26 U.S.C. § 104 (1995). The
relevant section of the tax code provided, “In General . . . gross income does
not include . . . the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or
agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of
personal injuries or sickness.” Id.
63
Hubbard, supra note 57, at 738 (providing theories for the exclusion
since Congress did not provide an explanation).
64
Id. at 739.
65
Id. at 736.
66
Id.; see Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415
(1913) (stating that “[i]ncome may be defined as the gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined”).
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because they are actually “returns” of capital.67 If recoveries for
personal injuries are merely returns of capital, they are outside
the tax code’s definition of taxable “income.”68 A second
possible explanation for the exclusion is that Congress made a
humanitarian policy decision benefiting tort victims by refusing
to tax their damage awards.69 Congress might have been
suggesting that victims of personal injuries deserve compensation
without an additional tax burden.70
To determine which damage awards should be excludable
from income taxation, courts first had to clarify what constituted
“personal injuries” within the meaning of the original exclusion
provision.71 During the 1920s, both the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the Board of Tax Appeals ruled that alienation of
affection and defamation constituted personal injuries, excluding
damage awards from taxation.72 The Board of Tax Appeals stated
that the damages “[made] the plaintiff whole as before the
injury” and did not constitute a gain in income.73 Therefore, the
67

Hubbard, supra note 57, at 739. For example, in O’Gilvie v. United
States, the Court stated that the exclusion of personal injury damages from
taxation has been based on the decision not to tax damages that are making up
for a loss to the victim. 519 U.S. 79, 80 (1996). See also Comm’r v.
Glenshaw Glass Co. 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955). “The long history of
departmental rulings holding personal injury recoveries nontaxable [is based]
on the theory that they roughly correspond to a return of capital . . . .” Id.
68
Hubbard, supra note 57, at 739. See also Stratton’s Independence, 231
U.S. at 415 (stating the historically accepted definition of “income” to be a
“gain”).
69
Hubbard, supra note 57, at 738-39.
70
Id. at 739.
71
Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254 § 213(b)(6), 20 Stat. 1057,
1066 (1919); see supra note 62 (providing the language of the tax code’s
original exclusion of personal injuries from gross income).
72
Sol. Op. 132, 1922-1 C.B. 92 (1922) (ruling that damages awarded for
alienation of affection, defamation and surrender of a minor’s custody did not
constitute income); Hawkins v. Comm’r, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927) (excluding
damages awarded for defamation suit brought against former employer for
publishing defamatory statements). See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1356
(describing the implications of the Solicitor General’s opinion in 1992 on the
definition of income).
73
Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. at 1025.
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damages were excluded from taxation.74 Consistent with this
principle, during the 1950s several Internal Revenue rulings held
that the personal injury tax exclusion applied to compensation
payments for inhumane treatment by enemy governments to
former prisoners of war.75 In 1960, the Treasury ruled that
damages paid pursuant to a lawsuit or settlement based on “tort
or tort-type rights,” as opposed to contract rights, would be
excludable from income taxation.76
The passage of the federal civil rights acts required courts to
apply the personal injury tax exclusion to damages awarded in
the newly created employment discrimination causes of action.77
The tax court first addressed the taxation of damages awarded in
employment discrimination cases in 1975 in Hodge v.

74

Id.
See Rev. Rul. 58-370, 1958-2 C.B. 14 (1958) (ruling that payments
made by Austria to victims of Nazi persecution were excludable); Rev. Rul.
56-462 1956-2 C.B. 20 (1956) (ruling that payments to prisoners of war in the
Korean War were excludable); Rev. Rul. 56-518, 1956-2 C.B. 25 (1956)
(ruling that payments to victims of Nazi persecution were excludable); Rev.
Rul. 55-132, 1955-1 C.B. 213 (1955) (ruling that payments to prisoners of
war in World War II for violation of the Geneva Convention were
excludable); Sager & Cohen, supra note 9, at 454, n.48 (indicating IRS
rulings affirming the position that damages received from personal injuries
were not taxable).
76
Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1960); see Sager & Cohen, supra note 9, at
454.
77
F. Philip Manns, Jr., Restoring Tortiously Damaged Human Capital
Tax-Free Under Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a)(2)’s New Physical
Injury Requirement, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 356-57 (1998). This is because,
for the first time, tax courts were required to determine whether injuries
caused by employment discrimination should be taxable income. Id. Courts
differed on whether it was appropriate to look toward the nature of the injuries
caused by violations of the Civil Rights Act or the nature of the damages
provided to successful plaintiffs in determining the taxability of damage
awards. Id. See Hodge v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 616, 619 (1975) (requiring
taxation of a back-pay award granted in a racial discrimination case because of
the nature of the damage award). But see Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 692,
697 (9th Cir. 1983) (ruling that a damage award from a defamation action was
excludable because of the nature of the claim).
75
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Commissioner.78 The court concluded that back pay awarded in a
Title VII employment case was taxable income because it was not
based on a personal injury.79 The court further reasoned that
since wages are ordinarily taxable income, an award for lost
wages should be taxable as well.80
Most circuit courts disagreed with the tax court’s approach in
Hodge.81 During the 1980s, the Sixth and Ninth circuits changed
the direction of the interpretation of the personal injury
exclusion.82 These courts looked toward the nature of the claim
rather than the nature of the damages awarded to determine
whether the damages should be subject to income taxation.83
78

Hodge, 64 T.C. 616. The plaintiff, a former truck driver, alleged that
he had been denied a job transfer from “city driver” to “line driver” because
of his race. Id. at 617. He was awarded the difference between his salary in
his current job and the job to which he had been denied a promotion. Id. He
and his wife then attempted to exclude half of the damages awarded on the
basis that he was being compensated for a personal injury. Id. at 618. The
court ruled that the back-pay award was taxable income. Id. at 619.
79
Id. The court did not rule on the taxability of a compensatory damage
award because the 1991 Act had not yet been passed, so compensatory
damages were not recoverable for Title VII claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5g
(2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2003).
80
Hodge, 64 T.C. at 619. Therefore, it was the nature of the award that
determined its taxability. Manns, supra note 77, at 359.
81
Manns, supra note 77, at 359. See Rickel v. Comm’r, 900 F.2d 655,
661-64 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing the tax court’s determination that the nature
of damages rather than the nature of the claim should be determinative of the
taxability of damages); Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988)
(ruling that damages in a malicious prosecution and injury to reputation case
were excludable because of the nature of the claims); Roemer, 716 F.2d at
697. But see Thompson v. Comm’r, 866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1989) (ruling
consistent with Hodge that the claim for back pay was not excludable because
it was essentially a contractual claim for unpaid wages, and therefore was not
a tort-type award). On the other hand, the Thompson court ruled that
liquidated damages were excludable from taxation because they had been
awarded for a tort-type injury. Id.
82
Threlkeld, 848 F.2d 81; Roemer, 716 F.2d 692; see also Manns, supra
note 77, at 359.
83
Manns, supra note 77, at 359. Although these cases did not deal with
sexual harassment claims, they decided the tax treatment of damages received
in connection with other non-physical injuries and therefore are influential in
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First, in Roemer v. Commissioner the Ninth Circuit ruled that an
award for defamation should be excludable because of the nature
of the tort of defamation.84 The court determined that a
defamation claim was a personal injury within the purview of §
104(a)(2)’s exclusion.85 Ruling the damages excludable, the court
stated that “the relevant distinction that should be made is
between personal and non personal injuries, not between physical
and nonphysical injuries.”86
In 1986, the Sixth Circuit made a similar decision in
Threlkeld v. Commissioner.87 The plaintiff sought to exclude his
recovery for an injury to his reputation caused by a malicious
prosecution.88 The Sixth Circuit adopted the tax court’s holding
that any compensatory damages “received on account of any
invasion of the rights that an individual is granted by virtue of
being a person in the sight of the law” were excludable from
income tax.89 The court further explained that to determine
whether an injury was personal, “we must look to the origin and
character of the claim . . . and not to the consequences that result
from the injury.”90 Therefore, the nature of the actual injury, not
the nature of the damages received from the lawsuit, was the
dispositive factor in determining the tax treatment of the damages
deciding the tax treatment of damages received from sexual harassment
lawsuits. See Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84 (“We must look to the nature of the
underlying injury to determine excludability under [S]ection 104(a)(2).”);
Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697 (“We must look to the nature of the tort . . . to
determine whether the award should have been reported as gross income.”).
84
Roemer, 716 F.2d at 694 (ruling that Roemer, who won a lawsuit for
defamation created by a false credit report, was entitled to exclude his damage
awards from his gross income for tax purposes).
85
Id. at 697-98.
86
Id. at 697.
87
Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that
damages won by Threlkeld in a malicious prosecution suit resulting from his
endurance of a series of false lawsuits were excludable from taxation).
88
Id. at 81-82.
89
Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1308 (1986), aff’d, 848 F.2d 81
(6th Cir. 1988).
90
Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299. This analysis is termed the “nature of the
claim” test. Manns, supra note 77, at 359-60.
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awarded.91 The plaintiff’s recovery was excludable from income
tax because the nature of the injury was “personal.”92 The court
stated, “A personal injury has long been understood to include
non-physical as well as physical injuries. Therefore, ‘personal’
must be defined more broadly than ‘bodily’ injury.”93 In addition,
both the Roemer and Threlkeld courts held that lost earnings
received on account of both physical and non-physical injuries
were excludable from taxation.94 These rulings were made
despite the fact that wages are ordinarily taxable as income.95
B. The History of the Taxation of Employment Discrimination
Recoveries
During the years following Threlkeld, however, courts
struggled to apply the nature of the claim test to different types of
damage awards won in employment discrimination cases.96 In
1992, the Supreme Court in United States v. Burke held that a
back-pay award for a Title VII sex discrimination claim was
91

Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84; Douglas A. Kahn, Taxation of Damages
After Schleier—Where Are We and Where Do We Go From Here?, 15
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 305, 308-09 (1995) (examining past court rulings about
the taxation of personal injury damage awards).
92
Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299.
93
Id. at 1305. The types of non-physical injuries denied tax exclusion by
§ 104(a)(2) include employment discrimination, slander, libel, defamation and
wrongful death. Loiacono, supra note 2; see also Philip Buchan, New Hope on
NonPhysical Injury Taxes, TRIAL, Jan. 1998, at 11.
94
Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1300; Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 692, 697
(9th Cir. 1983).
95
Hodge v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 616, 619 (1975); see Threlkeld, 848 F.2d
at 81 (ruling that lost wages award is excludable); Roemer, 716 F.2d at 693
(ruling award for lost earnings to be excludable).
96
Downey v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 150, 161 (1991), rev’d, 33 F.3d 836 (7th
Cir. 1994) (ruling that damages received for age discrimination in employment
were excludable from gross income); Comm’r v. Burke, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th
Cir. 1991), rev’d, 504 U.S. 229 (1992) (ruling that a damage award for sex
discrimination was excludable from gross income). The tax court in Downey
stated, “Some confusion has arisen . . . when the focus has shifted from the
source and character of the injury . . . to its consequences.” Downey, 97 T.C.
at 161.
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taxable.97 The Court found the equitable remedies available for
Title VII claims distinguishable from the typical compensatory
damages available for the tort-type personal injuries aimed at in
the § 104(a) tax exclusion.98 Using its own version of the nature
of the claim approach, the Court held that a claim could not be
considered tort-like unless it provided remedies similar to
traditional tort claims.99 For instance, the Court compared the
damages available under Title VII, which only provided back
pay, with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which
provided for both compensatory and punitive damages.100 The
97

504 U.S. 229 (1992). This case was based on the pre-1991 amendment
Civil Rights Act pursuant to which compensatory damages were not
recoverable. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2003); Burke, 504 U.S. at 231; see
Brent B. Nicholson, Recent Developments Concerning the Taxation of
Damages Under Section 104(A)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 215, 218 (1997) (exploring the taxability of personal injury damage
awards and the Supreme Court’s decision in Burke). The original plaintiff in
Burke was Judy A. Hutcheson, who brought a Title VII claim in the Eastern
District of Tennessee. Burke, 504 U.S. at 231. Other employees, including
Therese A. Burke, joined, alleging that their employer had discriminated
against them by denying salary increases on the basis of their sex. Id. They
reached a settlement agreement with the employer and later petitioned the
district court for a determination that the settlement payments were excludable
from their gross income. Id. at 232. The district court ruled that the settlement
payments were not excludable, and the Sixth Circuit reversed. Id. at 232.
98
Burke, 504 U.S. at 237-38. Compensatory damages are typically
granted for pain, suffering, emotional distress, or injury to reputation.
Nicholson, supra note 97, at 218. The court looked back to the 1960 treasury
regulation which stated that any case arising under a tort or tort-type right
would be considered a personal injury and any damages flowing from such
injury would be excludable. Burke, 504 U.S. at 234; Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)
(1960); see supra text accompanying note 76. This type of analysis is termed
the “tort-type” or “tort-like” analysis. See Manns, supra note 77, at 361.
99
Burke, 504 U.S. at 237; Manns, supra note 77, at 360; see cases cited
supra note 83 (discussing the nature of the claim approach).
100
Burke, 504 U.S. at 240. At the time of the plaintiff’s claim, Title VII
allowed courts to award “such affirmative relief as may be appropriate,”
including back pay and reinstatement, as well as “any other equitable relief.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2003); Buckman, supra note 47, at § 2. Title VIII,
however, allowed plaintiffs to recover “actual damages” and “injunctive or
other equitable relief.” 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3) (1995). In addition, Title VIII
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Court suggested that were compensatory damages recoverable
under Title VII, a compensatory damage award would be
excludable because the injury would be within the same category
as tort-type injuries.101
After the 1991 Act expanded the types of damages
recoverable for discrimination suits, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) ruled that those damages were based on personal injuries.102
Therefore, “compensatory damages, including back pay,
received in satisfaction of a claim of disparate treatment gender
discrimination under Title VII . . . are excludable from gross
income as damages for personal injury under Section 104(a) of
the Code.”103 The ruling also held that this applied even if the
compensatory damages were comprised only of back pay.104
In Commissioner v. Schleier, however, the Supreme Court
ruled that the back pay and liquidated damages received in
settlement of an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
claim were not excludable from taxation.105 The Supreme Court

provides that the court may assess a “civil penalty” against the respondent. Id.
101
Burke, 504 U.S. at 237. The court stated:
Notwithstanding a common-law tradition of broad tort damages and
the existence of other federal antidiscrimination statutes offering
similarly broad remedies, Congress declined to recompense Title VII
plaintiffs for anything beyond the wages properly due them—wages
that, if paid in the ordinary course, would have been fully taxable.
Thus, we cannot say that a statute such as Title VII, whose sole
remedial focus is the award of back wages, redresses a tort-like
personal injury within the meaning of § 104(a)(2) and the applicable
regulations.
Id. at 241.
102
Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 CB 61 (1993); 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003);
see infra Part I.B (describing the expansion of available remedies for sex
discrimination in employment plaintiffs).
103
Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 CB 61. The ruling also applied to disparate
treatment racial discrimination under Title VII as well as amounts received
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id.
104
Id. The ruling was short-lived, however, as it was suspended. Rev.
Rul. 95-45, 1995-1 C.B. 53 (1995). See infra text accompanying notes 117-19
(discussing the IRS’s position after Rev. Rul. 93-88 was suspended).
105
515 U.S. 323, 327 (1995) (holding that a member of an age
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granted certiorari to resolve the appellate court conflict about the
tax exclusion of damages.106 At the time Schleier was decided,
the ADEA provided only punitive damages and back pay as
remedies.107 Therefore, the Court followed Burke’s “tort-type”
reasoning to decide the available remedies were not sufficient to
render the recovery excludable from income tax under §
104(a).108 The Court found that the victim in Schleier suffered
several different injuries when he was fired in contravention of
the ADEA.109 Although emotional distress was a personal injury,
discrimination class action suit against United Airlines was required to pay
income taxes on his entire $145,629 settlement, which included both back pay
and liquidated damages). Pursuant to the ADEA, an individual proving she has
been discriminated against on the basis of age can sue to recover lost wages. If
the discrimination is willful, the individual may recover liquidated damages in
the amount equal to lost wages. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000). See Schleier, 515
U.S. at 325-26.
106
Id. at 327. David B. Jennings, The Supreme Court Gets Tough with
I.R.C. S 104(A)(2) Exclusions: Taxpayer Discrimination Awards Suffer Injury
as a Result of Commissioner v. Schleier, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865, 866
(1996) (reporting on the status of the taxation of damage awards prior to
1996). The case was specifically taken to resolve a split among the Ninth,
Seventh and Fifth circuits, which had conflicted over whether back pay and
liquidated damages received in age discrimination suits were excludable.
Schmitz v. Comm’r, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994); Downey v. Comm’r, 33
F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994); Schleier v. Comm’r, 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994).
107
29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 626 (1994). “Amounts owing to a person as a
result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation . . . provided that liquidated damages
shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter.” 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b). The Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston ruled
that liquidated damages received pursuant to the ADEA are considered
punitive damages. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
108
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323; Jennings, supra note 106, at 866.
109
Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330; Kahn, supra note 91, at 329. One injury he
may have suffered was emotional distress. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 330. The
plaintiff was fired from his position at United Airlines at the age of sixty,
according to the company’s policy at that time. Id. at 325. He and other
employees sued the employer in a class action seeking lost earnings, liquidated
damages, injunctive relief and other relief. Id. at 326. The emotional distress
he suffered could have stemmed from the emotional pain and humiliation from
being fired from his job. Id. at 329. Another injury he suffered was the
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he was not compensated for it through his lawsuit.110 He was
compensated for the loss of his job through back pay, but this
was an economic injury and not a personal injury.111 Therefore, it
did not satisfy the tort-type Burke test, and could not be excluded
from income tax.112
Even though the Court found that ADEA damages were not
consistent with tort-type rights to satisfy Burke, the Court further
stated that the Burke test was not the final analysis.113 Instead, the
Court articulated a two-part test to determine whether the tax
exclusion applied.114 The Court stated that the exclusion applied
only when the damages “(i) [were] received through prosecution
or settlement of an action based upon tort or tort-type rights . . .
and (ii) [were] received on account of personal injuries or
sickness.”115 Therefore, because the plaintiff’s settlement award
was not based on a personal injury, he could not exclude the
award from his gross income.116
Following Schleier, on December 30, 1996, the IRS issued
another ruling on the subject.117 The ruling stated that in
employment discrimination cases, lost wages must be included in
the calculation of gross income, but emotional distress awards
could be excluded.118 This ruling superseded the ruling issued
prior to Schleier, and conformed the IRS’s position to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Schleier.119

economic loss from having his job taken away. Id. at 330-31.
110
Kahn, supra note 91, at 329. The plaintiff had won a set of “liquidated
damages,” but the Court considered those to be punitive damages, and
therefore not received on account of a personal injury. Schleier, 515 U.S. at
323. Thus, they could not be excluded. Kahn, supra note 91, at 329.
111
Kahn, supra note 91, at 329-30.
112
Schleier, 515 U.S. at 334.
113
Id. at 333-34; Jennings, supra note 106, at 883.
114
Schleier, 515 U.S. at 333-34.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 337.
117
Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6 (1996).
118
Id.
119
Id. See supra note 104 (citing the suspension of the ruling in effect
prior to Schleier); supra text accompanying notes 102-04 (explaining the IRS
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In the same month, the Supreme Court held that punitive
damages for physical injuries were not excludable under §
104(a).120 Although the case involved punitive damages awarded
for a physical injury, the opinion included an important
discussion of the policy supporting § 104(a)’s historical tax
exclusion of certain damage awards.121 The Court questioned §
104(a)’s exclusion of lost wages from taxation, stating that
exclusion for that type of damages goes “beyond what one might
expect a purely tax-policy related ‘human capital’ rationale to
justify.”122 The Court observed that exclusion of lost wages
entitled the victim to a windfall because she would not have to
pay taxes on wages that she would ordinarily have paid if not for
the personal injury.123 The Court was suggesting that just as
punitive damages, which serve to punish wrongdoing, did not
restore “human capital,” neither did an award for lost wages;
therefore, neither should be excludable from gross income.124
C. Taxation of Compensatory Damage Awards After the Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996
In 1996, through a provision in the Small Business Job
ruling in effect prior to the Supreme Court decision in Schleier).
120
O’Gilvie v. U.S., 519 U.S. 79 (1996) (holding that the surviving
spouse of a tort victim was required to pay taxes on punitive damages won in
the victim’s suit for personal injuries). This case was decided after § 104(a)
was amended in 1996, but the decision was based on the pre-amendment
statute. Id. In 1995, the relevant section of the tax code provided that “gross
income does not include . . . the amount of any damages received . . . on
account of personal injuries or sickness.” 26 U.S.C. § 104 (1995). The
plaintiffs in the case were the husband and children of a woman who died of
toxic shock syndrome in 1983. O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 81. The plaintiffs sued
the manufacturer of the product that had caused her death and were awarded
$1,525,000 in actual damages and $10 million in punitive damages. Id. The
plaintiffs paid income tax on the punitive damages but argued that they should
be refunded. Id.
121
O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 82-90.
122
Id. at 86.
123
Id.
124
Id.
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Protection Act (SBJPA),125 Congress created a bright line rule to
determine which damage awards would be taxable in the
future.126 Although the SBJPA was best known for its increase of
the minimum wage and tax cuts to small businesses,127 it also
contained a provision amending § 104(a) to state that only nonpunitive damages paid on account of physical injuries or physical
sickness may be excluded from gross income.128
The amended statute also explicitly states that, with one

125

Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996).
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003). The SBJPA was codified throughout
several provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, but the damage award
amendment is specifically codified in 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2). Id.
127
Pub. L. No. 104-188. The Conference report on the Act stated its
purposes were to:
[P]rovide tax relief for small businesses, to protect jobs, to create
opportunities, to increase the take home pay of workers, to amend the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 relating to the payment of wages to
employees who use employer owned vehicles, and to amend the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 to increase the minimum wage rate and
to prevent job loss by providing flexibility to employers in complying
with minimum wage and overtime requirements under that Act.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-737 (1996).
128
Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 110 Stat.
1755 (1996). The relevant post-amendment sections read:
(a) In General. Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not
in excess of) deductions allowed under Section 213 (relating to
medical to medical, etc. expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross
income does not include—
126

...
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages)
received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or
as periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or
physical sickness.
...
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated
as a physical injury or physical sickness.
26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2003). See supra note 62 for the pre-amendment code
sections.
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notable exception,129 emotional distress is not within the
definition of physical injuries or sickness.130 This means that a
lawsuit based on emotional distress alone will not trigger the §
104(a)(2) exclusion for damage awards.131 On the other hand, if a
claim for emotional distress is attached to a physical personal
injury, compensatory damages received for emotional distress
can be excluded from the individual’s gross income.132 To clarify,
if an individual receives a compensatory damage award or
settlement stemming from a physical personal injury, the entire
award would be excludable from taxation.133 In contrast, if an
129

The portion of a compensatory damage awards allotted to the
reimbursement of medical expenses relating to emotional distress stemming
from any personal injury (physical or non-physical) may be excluded from
gross income. § 104(a); A. Van Lanckton & Joseph A. Brear, Jr., Federal
Tax Treatment of Personal Injury Damages, 44 PRACTICAL LAWYER No. 3,
59, at 60 (1998).
130
26 U.S.C. § 104; see supra note 128 (providing the exact language of
the statute’s emotional distress reference). Compensatory damages received on
account of wrongful death actions or loss of consortium claims are excludable
from gross income pursuant to § 104(a)(2). Internal Revenue Service, Lawsuit
DIGITAL
DAILY,
Awards
and
Settlements,
at
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/page/0,,id=7050,00.html [hereinafter Lawsuit
Awards and Settlements] (last visited April 18, 2003). The House Committee
Report for the 1996 amendment states:
If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness,
then all damages (other than punitive) that flow therefrom are treated
as payments received on account of physical injury or physical
sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is the injured
party. For example, damages (other than punitive) received by an
individual on account of a claim for loss of consortium due to the
physical injury or physical sickness of such individual’s spouse are
excludable from gross income.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-737, at 88 (1996).
131
26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2003).
132
See Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion: Congress Gets
Physical But Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV.
51, 87 (1997) (explaining the different interpretations of the emotional distress
provision in § 104(a)(2)); see also Coyle, supra note 8 (stating, “If a plaintiff
received damages for pain and suffering attendant to a physical injury, the
plaintiff could still deduct those damages from gross income.”).
133
§ 104(a)(2); Robert Margolis, Personal Injuries—Physical and
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individual were to recover compensatory damages stemming
from a non-physical personal injury, the entire award would be
taxable.134
According to the 1996 House Ways and Means Committee
Report on the SBJPA, one reason for the amendment was to end
confusion about the tax treatment of damages in non-physical
injury cases, in light of decisions such as Schleier.135 Although
the full reasoning for Congress’s distinction between physical and
non-physical injuries remains speculative, the origin of the
amendment is easily traceable to the federal government’s
continuing search for revenue.136 To increase federal funds,
NonPhysical, 1 MERTENS LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX’N § 7.91 (2002). This
exclusion applies to a lost wages award a plaintiff recovers in a physical injury
lawsuit. § 104(a)(2). Any punitive damages, however, would not be
excludable for any type of injury pursuant to § 104(a)(2). See id. This could
theoretically cause a problem in a situation where a plaintiff in a physical
injury case is awarded a lump sum settlement including both punitive and
compensatory damages. Lanckton & Brear, supra note 129, at 63. If the
award comes from a trial by jury, the jury will state which part of the award
was attributed to the compensatory damages as opposed to punitive damages.
Id. If the award comes from a settlement, however, the person who prepares
the tax payer’s tax return must determine which portion of the award is
attributable to punitive damages or compensatory damages. Id. There is a
good faith requirement for this, and the preparer must look at all the evidence
as well as the initial complaint requesting certain amounts for damages. Id.
This also sends a message to potential plaintiffs in physical injury lawsuits to
consider the tax consequences of their categorization of damages when they
prepare their initial complaints. Id.
134
§ 104(a)(2); see Lanckton & Brear, supra note 129, at 60 (giving an
example of tax consequences to plaintiff who wins damages for a non-physical
injury).
135
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-737 (1996).
The Supreme Court recently held that damages received based on a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act could not be
excluded from income . . . . The House bill provides that the
exclusion from gross income only applies to damages received on
account of a personal physical injury or physical sickness.
Id.; see also Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
136
Marcia Coyle, U.S. Tax on Damages Under Fire: Bill to Repeal ‘96
Levy Has Backing of Both Business, Plaintiff Bar, 21 NAT. L.J. 50, Aug. 9,
1999, at A1. When Congress gave tax breaks to small businesses, it needed to
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Congress made all punitive damage awards as well as all
damages received on account of non-physical personal injuries
taxable income.137
D. Taxation of Attorneys’ Fees
A separate but related issue to the taxation of compensatory
damage awards is the taxation of contingent attorneys’ fees and
costs. Contingent attorneys’ fees often make up a significant
portion of the monetary damages successful plaintiffs in sex
discrimination cases receive in their judgments or settlements.138
It is settled that, similar to compensatory damage awards,
attorneys’ fees and costs awarded to plaintiffs in cases based on
physical injuries are excluded from income tax.139 On the other
hand, confusion remains about how attorneys’ fees and costs
awarded for claims of non-physical injuries should be taxed.140
The Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh circuits have held contingency
fees excludable from gross income for federal income tax

recover the resultant loss in federal income. Id.
137
26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2003); see also Coyle, supra note 136. This rule
has not been changed since § 104(a) was amended in 1996. The changes in the
amendment apply to awards received after August 20, 1996, unless received
under a “binding written agreement, court decree, or mediation award in
effect on (or issued on or before) September 13, 1995. Lawsuit Awards and
Settlements, supra note 130. The estimated revenue return from the date of
this amendment through the year 2000 was $230 million. Coyle, supra note
136.
138
Paul M. Jones, NonPhysical Personal Injury Settlements and
Judgments: Amending the Internal Revenue Code to Exclude Attorney Fees, 35
IND. L. REV. 245 (2001). The court may award a prevailing party a
“reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs” in cases under Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2003); supra note 53.
139
§ 104(a); Jones, supra note 138, at 246 (citing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-52080 (Sept. 30, 1999), which held that damages awarded in a physical injury
case were excludable from gross income).
140
Jones, supra note 138, at 246 (commenting on the “crucial shift”
taking place “with respect to the income tax treatment of attorney fees
awarded in non-physical personal injury settlements and judgments”).
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purposes.141 On the other hand, the First, Ninth, and Federal
circuits have held that contingent attorneys’ fees must be included
in gross income and then may be declared as a miscellaneous
itemized deduction.142
The Seventh Circuit, in Kenseth v. Commissioner, tried to
resolve the dispute between a divided tax court’s decision.143 The
court ruled that a portion of the plaintiff’s settlement award used
to pay a contingent attorney’s fee had to be included in his
calculation of gross income.144 The court held that when a
taxpayer pays a lawyer pursuant to a contingency fee agreement,
the taxpayer receives the benefit of the funds because the court
allows the taxpayer to recover the full amount of the fee through
the lawsuit.145 Since the taxpayer benefits from the use of the fee,
the award must be included in the calculation of gross income,

141

Id. at 247. These courts have explained that because state law in these
jurisdictions gives attorneys ownership rights in the income received in the
settlements or judgment awards, the plaintiff may exclude that portion of the
award from his or her own gross income. Id. at 247. See Clarks v. United
States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying the holding in Cotnam and
declining to follow the assignment of income approach); Davis v. Comm’r,
210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000) (allowing plaintiff to exclude portion of
damage award paid to plaintiff’s attorneys); Cotnam v. Comm’r, 263 F.2d 119
(5th Cir. 1959) (allowing exclusion of the award from gross income because
of Alabama law granting attorneys rights to the fees).
142
See Fredrickson v. Comm’r, 166 F.3d 342 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring
attorneys’ fees awarded to be included in plaintiff’s calculation of his gross
income); Alexander v. Comm’r, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995) (requiring
plaintiff to declare fees as deduction on income tax return); Baylin v. United
States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (ruling that a portion of plaintiff’s
award paid to attorneys should be included in taxpayer’s gross income); Jones,
supra note 138, at 247. These courts take the “assignment of income”
approach, reasoning that since plaintiffs “earn” the income from attorneys’
fees awards, they cannot assign that income and avoid paying taxes on it.
Jones, supra note 138, at 249.
143
114 T.C. 399 (2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that
contingent attorney’s fee awarded in settlement was not excludable from
plaintiff’s gross income).
144
Id.
145
Id. at 413. The court was using the “assignment of income” approach,
as described infra note 158.
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even though the attorney actually receives that portion of the
award.146 The court stated, however, that the plaintiff would be
allowed to declare his legal fees as a miscellaneous itemized
deduction.147
Unfortunately, the ability to declare an attorneys’ fee award
as a miscellaneous itemized deduction can create further negative
tax consequences for some plaintiffs.148 The limitations already
placed by the tax code on miscellaneous itemized deductions can
create situations where plaintiffs are taxed on their entire awards,
including the portions paid to their attorneys.149 Usually, the most
severe limitation on miscellaneous itemized deductions is the
“alternative minimum tax.”150 This rule entirely disallows
146

Kristina Maynard, The Fruit Does Not Fall Far from the Tree: The
Unresolved Tax Treatment of Contingent Attorney’s Fees, 33 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 991, 1016 (2002) (arguing that courts should require plaintiffs to include
attorneys’ fees awards in their gross income).
147
Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 413.
148
Jones, supra note 138, at 256.
149
Id. One limitation put on miscellaneous itemized deductions is that
miscellaneous itemized deductions are only deductible to the extent that the
aggregate amount of those deductions exceeds two percent of adjusted gross
income (AGI). 26 U.S.C. § 67(a) (2003); Maynard, supra note 146, at 1010.
If the deductions do not amount to more than two percent of a person’s AGI,
they cannot be deducted at all. Aaron C. Charrier, Taxing Contingency Fees:
Examining the Alternative Minimum Tax and Common Law Tax Principles, 50
DRAKE L. REV. 315, 325 (2002) (examining the circuit split on the tax
treatment of contingent attorneys’ fees and arguing that the current tax
doctrine contradicts the purpose of contingency fee agreements). For example,
assume that an individual wins $300,000 in a sex discrimination lawsuit in
addition to a $150,000 attorneys’ fees award. Her AGI will be $300,000. See
26 U.S.C. § 62 (2003) (providing a list of items that must be deducted from
an individual’s gross income to arrive at the amount of AGI); Maynard, supra
note 146, at 1010 n.120 (illustrating calculation of AGI). If she tries to deduct
the $150,000 fee award, 26 U.S.C. § 67(a) requires that she only be allowed
to deduct the amount of the attorneys’ fee award that exceeds two percent of
her AGI ($300,000). 26 U.S.C. § 67(a). Two percent of her AGI is $6,000.
Therefore, she would still be required to pay tax on $6,000 of her award. See
Jones, supra note 138, at 255 (providing a hypothetical illustration of the two
percent requirement for miscellaneous itemized deductions).
150
26 U.S.C. §§ 55-58 (2003). Maynard, supra note 146, at 1011 (“Even
more onerous than the limitations on deductions for legal fees for regular tax
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miscellaneous itemized deductions by people with significant
miscellaneous itemized deductions.151 The amount intended for
deduction is added back into the income tax base, and taxes are
then paid on the deduction.152 Moreover, the attorneys’ fees will
be subject to double taxation—the plaintiff’s attorney will also
pay his or her own income tax on the attorneys’ fee award,
despite the fact that the plaintiff is already paying taxes on the
award.153
An example of the negative effects of the double taxation of
attorneys’ fees is illustrated by the case of an Iowa citizen named
Don Lyons.154 Mr. Lyons won a sex discrimination lawsuit and

purposes is the treatment of such expenses under the Alternative Minimum
Tax.”). The alternative minimum tax is in place to prevent taxpayers with
“substantial economic income” from avoiding “significant tax liability by
using exclusions, deductions, and credits.” Charrier, supra note 149, at 331
(quoting the Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, 432 (1986)).
151
Charrier, supra note 149, at 324-26; Jones, supra note 138, at 255.
The alternative minimum tax rule is triggered when an individual’s tentative
minimum tax exceeds the amount the individual would normally pay in taxes
on his AGI. 26 U.S.C. § 51(a)(1)-(2) (2003); Charrier, supra note 149, at
326. Tentative minimum tax is found by calculating the individual’s alternative
minimum taxable income, which is usually the individual’s gross income
before making any itemized deductions. Id. at 326. If the amount of tax an
individual would pay on the alternative minimum taxable income exceeds the
amount she would pay on her AGI with the deduction, the individual will owe
the alternative minimum tax. Id. at 326. The alternative minimum tax is the
difference between the amount the individual owes in taxes on her AGI and
the amount the individual would owe on her alternative minimum taxable
income. Id. at 326-27. Thus, in effect, the alternative minimum tax provision
requires individuals to pay taxes on both their regular income and the income
listed as a miscellaneous itemized deduction. Id.
152
Jones, supra note 138, at 255; see also Charrier, supra note 149, at
326-28 (providing an illustration of how the alternative minimum tax works).
153
See Jones, supra note 138, at 256 (arguing that the double taxation of
attorneys’ fees should be abolished).
154
146 CONG. REC. S7160-03, S7163 (July 18, 2000) (statement by Sen.
Grassley of Iowa, in introducing H.R. 1997 and 4570, quoting a letter sent by
Don Lyons, a citizen of Iowa, regarding the current consequences of the
taxation of attorneys’ fees).

MEADMACROX.DOC

834

6/25/03 5:28 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

received $15,000 in damages.155 After being taxed on this award,
Mr. Lyons was left with $9,533.156 In a letter to Congress
requesting statutory revision to eliminate the tax consequences to
Mr. Lyons, his attorney, Victoria L. Herring, stated that she
would be requesting a fee reimbursement in the amount of
$150,000.157 Ms. Herring illustrated that if this request was
granted by the court, Mr. Lyons would be required to pay
$67,791 in taxes on the entire award.158 In Mr. Lyons’s
jurisdiction, plaintiffs are required to pay tax on attorneys’ fee
awards.159 Therefore, after applying his net damage award,
$9,533, to the tax payments he was required to make on his
attorneys’ fees, he would still owe the government $58,236
altogether.160 This was more than two-thirds his normal annual
salary and was required despite the fact that his attorney would
also be paying income tax on the award of attorneys’ fees.161
Even though he would be able to deduct the fee award as a
miscellaneous itemized deduction, the triggering of the
alternative minimum tax would require him to pay tax on the
award anyway.162
According to his letter, Mr. Lyons would be required to pay
$5,467 in taxes on his adjusted gross income (AGI).163 Mr.
155

Id. at S7163. Don Lyons sued under Title VII alleging that he was
retaliated against by his employer because he had “helped” his coworker in
filing a sex discrimination complaint against the employer. Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at S7164. Mr. Lyons’ attorney stated in her letter to Congress that
her fee request was based on her “hourly rate of $180.00 an hour (a rate much
less than that of lawyers in other cities, and probably less than the two defense
lawyers from Chicago who tried the case).” Id. She further stated, “The fees
and expenses amount may seem high, but is the result of a fair amount of
contentiousness and the need to take depositions in Kansas and Arizona.” Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. Ms. Herring stated, “Not only will I pay taxes on this figure
(gladly so), but my client will also and without the ability to deduct the sum
due to the pernicious effect of the alternative minimum tax!” Id.
163
Id. His AGI would be equal to his gross income less any itemized
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Lyons’s alternative minimum taxable income (AMTI) would be
his regular taxable income, subject to the provisions of sections
56 and 58 of the Internal Revenue Code.164 Section 56(b)(1)(A)(i)
prohibits miscellaneous itemized deductions.165 Therefore, Mr.
Lyon’s AMTI would be $165,000 because it would include his
attorney’s fee award (which he would list as a miscellaneous
itemized deduction) and his other income ($15,000 in damages
from his lawsuit).166 Assuming Mr. Lyons’s tentative minimum
tax would exceed the tax owed on his AGI ($15,000), the
alternative minimum tax rule would require that Mr. Lyons’s
entire AMTI be taxed as if it had not been reported as a
deduction at all.167 Instead, he would owe the difference between
his tentative minimum tax and his regular tax on his regular
taxable income, in addition to his regular tax.168 Therefore, he
would essentially have to pay taxes on his AGI of $15,000 in
addition to taxes owed on his deduction of $150,000.169 In effect,
he would be taxed as if he had made no deduction whatsoever.170

deductions he makes. 26 U.S.C. § 62 (2003). For example, if Mr. Lyons had
not earned any other income besides his damages and attorneys’ fee award, his
AGI would be $15,000 ($165,000 gross income less than $150,000 attorneys’
fee deduction equals $15,000). Id. Mr. Lyons’s actual gross income for that
year is unavailable.
164
26 U.S.C. § 55(b)(2)(A) (2003); Charrier, supra note 149, at 326.
165
26 U.S.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2003); Charrier, supra note 149, at 327.
“In determining the amount of the alternative minimum taxable income of any
taxpayer . . . no deduction shall be allowed . . . for any miscellaneous
itemized deduction.” § 56(b)(1)(A)(i).
166
See supra note 164.
167
See Charrier, supra note 149, at 326-27 (providing a hypothetical
illustration of how the alternative minimum tax provision works); Jones, supra
note 138, at 254-56 (illustrating how to calculate tentative minimum tax rates).
168
26 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1)-(2) (2003); Charrier, supra note 149, at 327.
Mr. Lyons would owe the difference between his tentative minimum tax and
the $5,647 that he would owe in regular tax. Id.; see text accompanying note
164.
169
Charrier, supra note 149, at 327.
170
Id.
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III. EFFECTS OF SECTION 104(A)(2) ON VICTIMS OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
Section 104(a) adds to the negative effects that victims of
sexual harassment already endure, such as the emotional harms
and social stigmas associated with sexual harassment.171 Section
104(a) creates economic disincentives for coming forth with
sexual harassment lawsuits because it requires successful
plaintiffs to pay taxes on their compensation.172 In addition, the
taxation of damages based on non-physical injuries insinuates that
sexual harassment is not a serious injury because damages based
on physical injuries are excludable from income tax.173
A. Social Stigma and Emotional Harms of Sexual Harassment
In the interests of justice and equality for men and women,
Congress recognized the need to compensate victims for the
suffering associated with sexual harassment.174 Unfortunately,
although this type of discrimination is a compensable injury,
many women still have trouble coming forward with allegations
against their employers when they have been sexually harassed.175
One major explanation is that sexual harassment involves

171

See infra Part III.A (discussing the implications § 104(a) has on
victims of sexual harassment); see generally MINK, supra note 15 (discussing
the harms and stigmas created by sexual harassment).
172
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003); see infra Part III.B (discussing the
financial consequences imposed by the tax code upon successful plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases).
173
See supra note 12; infra Part III.C (discussing the social and political
consequences of § 104(a)); see also infra note 221 (discussing various injuries
caused by sexual harassment).
174
42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2003); see supra Part I (discussing the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and the types of compensatory damages available to
victims of sexual harassment).
175
MINK, supra note 15, at 7.
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discussing personal, private subjects.176 In addition, bringing a
complaint of sexual harassment often requires the victim to
endure personal attacks on her character as well as suggestions
that she may have provoked the harassment, exaggerated it or
even lied about it.177 For exposing their harassers, women can be
stigmatized, blacklisted on the job market or ostracized by
colleagues and friends.178
The highly publicized cases of Paula Jones, who sued former
President Bill Clinton on allegations of sexual harassment,179 and
176

Id. at 7.
Id. at 27. See, e.g., CLARA BINGHAM & LAURA LEEDY GANSLER,
CLASS ACTION: THE STORY OF LOIS JENSON AND THE LANDMARK CASE THAT
CHANGED SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 349 (2002) (describing the first sexual
harassment class action, initiated by Lois Jenson and her fellow female mine
workers, who had endured years of hostile environment sexual harassment). In
the case of Lois Jenson, opposing attorneys pointed to the fact that she had
been raped and had not reported the crime at the time of the incident. Id. at
348-49. They argued that since she did not report it, she must have been lying
about the rape as well as her sexual harassment claim. Id. at 349.
Furthermore, despite an agreement between the parties to keep her rape
testimony private, the judge deciding the case included details about the rape
in his opinion, which then became public information. Id. at 349. Other
potential members of the class action lawsuit refused to join because they did
not want to have to answer painful questions about their families. Id. at 286.
178
MINK, supra note 15, at 101. A woman who complains of sexual
harassment in the workplace runs the risk of being “branded a troublemaker—
or worse, a feminist.” MINK, supra note 15, at 81; see also BINGHAM &
GANSLER, supra note 177, at 105 (describing the personal attacks Lois Jenson
endured after filing a sexual harassment complaint with her employer). Lois
Jenson started working for Eveleth Mines during the late 1970s. BINGHAM &
GANSLER, supra note 177, at 3. After enduring years of pervasive sexual
harassment, she came forward and filed a grievance with the mine worker’s
union. Id. at 100. After word of her complaint spread around the mine, she
found all four of her car tires slashed. Id. at 111. When she filed a complaint
with the state attorney general, her coworkers immediately shunned her. Id. at
126. “People stood together in groups giving her dirty looks, people avoided
her.” Id. at 126.
179
MINK, supra note 15, at 30. In 1998, Paula Jones’ lawsuit was
dismissed by the Eighth Circuit on a motion for summary judgment. Id.; Dan
Fruomkin, Case Closed, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1998, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/pjones/pjones.htm.
177
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Anita Hill, who publicly accused Justice Clarence Thomas of
sexual harassment,180 are poignant examples of the obstacles
women face when alleging sexual harassment.181 Both Anita Hill
and Paula Jones endured severe criticism and even public outrage
for coming forth with allegations against their male
supervisors.182 In particular, the public seemed to find it
important that Paula Jones had waited a number of years before
speaking publicly about her alleged harassment.183 The delay was
Her lawsuit alleged that former Governor of Arkansas and United States
President William Jefferson Clinton sexually harassed her while she was
employed with the State of Arkansas. Text of Paula Jones’ Complaint, All
Politics, Jan. 13, 1997, available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/
1997/01/13/jones.supremecourt/suit.shtml. Ms. Jones alleged that he had
made unwelcome sexual advances toward her and that she had felt her
employment would be threatened if she were to report the incident. Id. She
further alleged that she was later terminated because she had rejected the
sexual advances made by Mr. Clinton. Id.
180
MINK, supra note 15, at 99-100. Anita Hill never actually filed a
lawsuit against Justice Clarence Thomas, but during his Supreme Court
appointment hearings in 1991, she accused him of having made sexual
advances and harassing remarks towards her during their employment at the
EEOC. Id.; Florence George Graves, The Complete Anita Hill, B. GLOBE
MAG., Jan. 19, 2003, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/magazine/
2003/0119/coverstory.htm.
181
Graves, supra note 180 (reporting that even after her testimony had
ended, Ms. Hill faced media stakeouts at her home); Paula Jones’ Day In
Court Draws Nearer, All Politics, Jan. 8, 1997, available at
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/01/08/jones.morton/index.shtml
(reporting that “everybody in America knows who [Paula Jones] is,” but
recognizing the public’s “dismissive attitude” towards her).
182
MINK, supra note 15, at 2. “The vicious personal attacks weathered by
Anita Hill and Paula Jones are no different from those endured by many
women who bring sexual harassment claims, although the attacks against Hill
and Jones were far louder and more visible than most.” Id. After testifying at
Justice Thomas’s appointment hearings, Anita Hill faced “death threats,
strangers condemning her to hell, hostile stares” and was accused of “flat-out
perjury.” Graves, supra, note 180. “The GOP had tried to portray Hill as a
spurned woman who had fantasized a sexual relationship with Thomas.” Id.
Paula Jones was portrayed as a “trailer park bimbo” in the public eye. Paula
Jones’ Day in Court Draws Nearer, supra note 181.
183
MINK, supra note 15, at 2, 117. Paula Jones was characterized as a
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used against her as a way for society to judge the credibility of
her claim.184 One possible reason she did not immediately come
forward, though, is that she, like most victims of sexual
harassment, first tried to cope with the harassment privately
instead.185
The fact that so many women over the years have had very
little choice but to quietly endure the effects of sexual harassment
is one reason the right to sue under Title VII exists—it legitimizes
women’s experiences and encourages them to report incidences
of sexual harassment.186 The Supreme Court has stated that the
“gold digger” for attempting to pursue her claim once Mr. Clinton had
become president. Id. at 2. Mrs. Clinton stated on the Today Show, on
January 27, 1998, that Ms. Jones’ claim against the president was part of a
right-wing conspiracy against him. Id. at 117; Hillary Clinton: ‘This is a
All
Politics,
Jan.
27,
1998,
Battle,’
available
at
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/01/27/hillary.today.
184
MINK, supra note 15, at 4-5. The public questioned Ms. Jones’s
motives for coming forward with allegations of sexual harassment. Id. at 5.
Some stated that Hill was more credible than Jones because Hill had been
forced to come forward while Jones did so voluntarily. Anna Quindlen, A Tale
of Two Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at A1.
185
MINK, supra note 15, at 81; see supra notes 184-86 (discussing the
various disincentives for coming forth with sexual harassment lawsuits).
Women are particularly susceptible to struggling privately with sexual
discrimination in “hostile work environments,” where the complaint process is
long and tedious. MINK, supra note 15, at 81. Lois Jenson, before
commencing the first class action sexual harassment lawsuit in America, stated
in her diary:
It amazes me that through the years women have kept so silent, but
think it should not amaze me, for I have done the same. Since it is
against the law. In fact this is not an isolated case but merely that we
do not go public. One thought comes to mind. How many violent
crimes have emanated from women trying to handle harassment
themselves? After all, companies have no set policy until it becomes a
necessity and that means that a woman has tried everything she could
first and then went to the company . . . .
BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 177, at 105.
186
BINGHAM & GANSLER, supra note 177, at 101. In referring to Title
VII, in Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., the third circuit stated:
Throughout this nation’s history, persons have far too often been
judged not by their individual merit, but by the fortuity of their race,
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purpose of the Civil Rights Act was “to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of . . . employees over
other employees.”187 With so many personal, social and political
consequences of speaking out about harassment, Title VII
recognizes that there should be incentives to persuade women to
expose incidences of harassment and encourage people to take
steps to eliminate sexual harassment.188 The federal taxation
scheme should be used to support this notion, not contradict it.

the color of their skin, the sex or year of their birth, the nation of
their origin, or the religion of their conscientious choosing. Congress
has responded to these pernicious misconceptions and ignoble hatreds
with humanitarian laws formulated to wipe out the iniquity of
discrimination in employment, not merely to recompense the
individuals so harmed, but principally to deter future violations . . . .
A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case accordingly acts not
only to vindicate his or her personal interests in being made whole,
but also as a ‘private attorney general’ to enforce the paramount
public interests in eradicating invidious discrimination.
31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated by 514 U.S. 1034, 115 S. Ct.
1397, 131 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1995), reinstated by 65 F.3d 1974 (3d Cir. 1995)
(ruling in favor of the plaintiff, who alleged sex and age discrimination in
employment). Mardell was placed on probation and eventually discharged
from her position as a manager for the Harleysville Life Insurance Company.
Id. at 1222-23. She alleged that she was discharged on the basis of her sex and
age, and that she had specifically been told that she “couldn’t be a good old
boy” and that the insurance agents would think of her as a “wife.” Id. at 1223.
The employer tried to counter these arguments by revealing evidence that Ms.
Mardell had made false representations on her employment application and
resume, and that, therefore, the employer could not be found liable for the
employment discrimination. Id. at 1223. The court found for Ms. Mardell,
stating that this type of “after-acquired evidence” did not absolve the employer
from liability. Id. at 1237.
187
Albermale Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
188
One way the government has done this is to create the EEOC. See
supra Part I (discussing the purposes of the EEOC).
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B. Section 104(a) as an Economic Disincentive to
Commencing Sexual Harassment Lawsuits
Section 104(a) creates yet another disincentive for victims of
sexual harassment to speak out because it taxes any compensatory
damages they might receive through lawsuits.189 A recent
example is the case of Cynthia C. Spina, who was awarded $3
million by a jury in her sex discrimination and harassment suit
against her employer, the Forest Preserve District of Cook
County.190 After winning $950,000 in attorneys’ fees, in addition
to $3 million in punitive and compensatory damages, she still
owed an additional $99,000 to the IRS.191 Therefore, after
winning her lawsuit for one of the most egregious violations of
Title VII ever seen, she owed more to the IRS than she was
actually awarded.192
The tax consequences for Ms. Spina were so burdensome that
she asked the court to consider the taxation of her award when
deciding by how much her jury verdict award should be
reduced.193 In denying her argument, the magistrate judge stated
that he was aware of the tax consequences and was not
unsympathetic, but “Congress, not this Court, must correct any

189

See supra Part II (explaining the tax treatment of compensatory
damages).
190
Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 2d 764
(2002). Ms. Spina won her sexual discrimination, harassment and retaliation
claims against her employer. Id. at 767. She alleged that she had been berated,
belittled and isolated by her male colleagues because of her sex. Id. at 767.
She complained to her supervisors about her treatment, but the harassment
only escalated. Id. at 767. Finally, she filed a complaint with the EEOC and
filed suit shortly thereafter. Id. at 768.
191
Liptak, supra note 6. There are no reports on Ms. Spina’s exact tax
returns. See infra notes 196-200.
192
Liptak, supra note 6. The magistrate judge presiding over Ms. Spina’s
case stated that he did not know of another case in which a plaintiff had
“endured such continuous harassment at the hands of so many different
officers and superiors for such an extended period of time.” Spina, 207 F.
Supp. 2d at 774.
193
Spina, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 777.

MEADMACROX.DOC

842

6/25/03 5:28 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

shortcomings in the tax code’s application.”194 Although Ms.
Spina sought an equitable exception in her circumstances, the
court declined “[p]laintiff’s invitation to venture down a slippery
slope and wage into this legal morass under a guise of equitable
relief.”195
There are several reasons why Ms. Spina’s award of
approximately $4 million ended up costing her almost $100,000
more than what she received.196 First, the judge was required to
reduce Ms. Spina’s jury award from $3 million to $300,000.197
The double taxation of attorneys’ fees and costs also caused
negative tax consequences for Ms. Spina.198 When Ms. Spina was
awarded approximately one million dollars in attorneys’ fees in
addition to her compensatory and punitive damages, she had to
pay income tax on the fees.199 Although she was in a jurisdiction
where she could deduct the portion of the award allotted to the
payment of attorneys’ fees, the large deduction triggered the
alternative minimum tax and required her to pay tax on almost
her entire award anyway.200

194

Id. (quoting Hukkanen Campbell v. Comm’r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1314
(10th Cir. 2001)).
195
Id.
196
Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 2d 764, 777
(2002).
197
Id. at 776. The judge did this in compliance with the cap put on
compensatory damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. §
1981(b)(3) (2003). See supra note 51 (discussing the damage cap provision of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also Buckman, supra note 47, at § 5.
198
Coyle, supra note 8. In certain districts, taxpayers are required to pay
taxes on the attorneys’ fees and costs they receive when their lawsuits are
based on non-physical injuries. See supra note 142 (listing districts that require
taxation of attorneys’ fees). Illinois, the state in which Ms. Spina brought her
lawsuit, requires that plaintiffs pay tax on their awards according to the
“assignment of income” approach. Liptak, supra note 6; see supra note 142
(explaining the “assignment of income” approach).
199
Coyle, supra note 8; Liptak, supra note 6.
200
26 U.S.C. §§ 55-58 (2003). See supra Part II.D (illustrating the
alternative minimum tax). Assuming that Ms. Spina made no additional
itemized deductions and earned no additional income in the tax year, her
alternative minimum taxable income amounted to $1,250,000. §§ 55-58. This
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In addition, negative tax consequences can also arise when
plaintiffs win lump sum back-pay awards in employment
discrimination cases.201 The IRS requires the taxation of back-pay
awards in the year received, even though the awards usually
reflect several years’ of lost pay.202 As a result, those who win
lump sum back-pay awards are often placed into higher income
tax brackets (with higher assigned tax rates) than they would
have been in had they received their wages on a regular basis.203
Meanwhile, if back pay or lost wages are awarded in a physical
injury case, they are not taxed at all.204 Thus, the tax code entitles
is because AMTI is equal to her AGI in addition to all miscellaneous itemized
deductions. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65 (explaining alternative
minimum taxable income). Her regular AGI would be equal to $300,000
because she would be listing the $950,000 attorneys’ fee award as a deduction.
26 U.S.C. § 62 (2003). The tentative minimum tax would then be established
using her AMTI. Jones, supra note 138, at 255. She would be required to pay
the difference between her tentative minimum tax and the regular tax she
would owe on her regular AGI ($300,000). Id. Altogether, by operation of
these rules in her particular situation, she owed approximately $99,000 in
taxes. Liptak, supra note 6.
201
26 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 3402 (2003). Spina’s case does not mention
whether Ms. Spina was awarded back pay. Spina, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 776.
The court attributed $200,000 of her award to emotional distress while
$100,000 was to compensate her for damage to her reputation. Id. at 776.
202
26 U.S.C. § 104(a). The Internal Revenue Code does not include any
provision allowing a lump sum award for back pay to be taxed over a number
of years. 146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000). Instead, it is
taxed as a lump sum in the year that it was awarded by a jury or in a
settlement. Id.; Successful Plaintiff Gets Extra Money to Cover Extra Tax,
Says P.A. Court, 6 ANDREWS SEX. HARASSMENT LIT. REP. No. 8, at 12 (Oct.
2000) (discussing the case of O’Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp.
2d 443 (E.D. Penn. 2000), where the court awarded the plaintiff money to
cover the negative tax consequences of receiving a lump sum back-pay
award).
203
146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000).
204
Id. The Supreme Court in O’Gilvie pointed out that an exclusion for
lost wages actually entitles victims to a windfall in that they would ordinarily
be required to pay income tax on those wages had they earned them through
employment. O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86. After the 1996 amendment to §
104(a), however, only victims of physical injuries are entitled to this
preferential treatment. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003).
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victims of physical injuries to another inequitable tax benefit.205
All of this leads to the conclusion that when potential
plaintiffs approach a lawyer about initiating sexual harassment
litigation, they face another consideration—the possibility that, if
they win, they may be in a worse financial position than when
they started.206 Women who decide to bring sexual harassment
claims already have to consider the risk of job loss, injury to
their reputations and the economic consequences of losing their
lawsuits.207 Now, they also must take into account the fact that,
even if they establish liability, they may have to pay the IRS

205

See 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2); see also Sager & Cohen, supra note 9, at
448-49 (criticizing the distinction made between the exclusion of back pay in
physical injury cases and the taxation of back pay in non-physical injury
cases). Sager and Cohen argue that in all personal injury cases, damages for
lost earnings should be taxable and damages received for pain and suffering
should be excludable because damages should be taxed only if they
compensate the taxpayer for money that would have been taxable if received
under usual circumstances. Id. at 449-50.
206
Liptak, supra note 6 (reporting that attorneys must now instruct clients
on the potential effects of § 104(a) on their damage recoveries). As a general
rule, in cases based on federal statutes, evidence and arguments about the tax
consequences of verdict amounts may be introduced to the jury. See Kenneth
G. Zaleski, Jury Instructions as to Tax Consequences, 5 MERTENS LAW OF
FED. INCOME TAX’N § 24A:12 (2002). State laws vary on this issue, though.
Id. The majority rule is that juries may not be told of the tax status of personal
injury awards in state actions. Id. This principle was articulated in the leading
case on the subject, Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, where the Supreme
Court ruled that it was error not to instruct the jury as to the tax-free status of
damages awarded in a Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) wrongful
death action. 444 U.S. 490 (1980); Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45
U.S.C. § 51 (2003). In Norfolk, the plaintiff suffered fatal injuries during his
employment as a fireman. Norfolk, 444 U.S. at 491. His estate sued under
FELA and was awarded $750,000 of non-taxable damages by a jury. Id. The
appellate court ruled that it was not error for the court to have not instructed
the jury that the plaintiffs would not be required to pay tax on the award. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 498. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s
ruling has often been limited to actions arising under FELA and, unfortunately
for victims like Ms. Spina, is not always followed in cases arising under
federal laws. See Zaleski, supra note 206.
207
See supra Part III.A (discussing the harms of sexual harassment).
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more than they recover in damages.208 Women are much less
likely to take their chances suing employers for harassment if
they think they may have to exhaust their financial resources
litigating with no reward in the end.209 Instead, they are left to
endure the personal effects of sexual harassment quietly, while
those guilty of harassment escape any consequences.210
The financial disincentives created by § 104(a)(2) may
decrease the number of Title VII sexual harassment claims
prosecuted by victims.211 Because meritorious lawsuits are
burdened by § 104(a), this provision undermines the Title VII
goals of enabling and encouraging victims to bring sex
discrimination claims.212 If victims no longer have a reason to
pursue lawsuits against those guilty of harassment, there will be
no consequences in place for employers who violate Title VII and

208

See Spina v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook County, 207 F. Supp. 764,
777 (2002).
209
Liptak, supra note 6 (citing Cynthia Spina’s lawyer, Monica
McFadden, who said that the “tax laws will result in fewer civil rights
cases”). Ms. McFadden went on to state, “It has an enormously chilling
effect. I have to advise a person coming to me that it is entirely possible not
only that any award they achieve will go to the Internal Revenue Service but
that they will owe the Internal Revenue Service money.” Id. “It’s had a
chilling effect on employment discrimination cases and dire consequences for
some people. If people can’t afford to win, why would they go to the trouble
of even pursuing the case, no matter how important or meritorious.” Coyle,
supra note 8 (quoting Carlton Carl of the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America (ATLA)).
210
MINK, supra note 15, at 3.
211
See supra note 209 (quoting an attorney on the resultant loss of
lawsuits caused by the taxation of non-physical injury damage awards).
212
Coyle, supra note 136. The Supreme Court in Meritor stated that Title
VII “affords employees the right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). The EEOC furthers this goal by asking
employers to implement reporting systems that encourage victims of sexual
harassment to come forward with claims. U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual
Harassment, at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/currentissues.html (last visited
March 21, 2003).
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the EEOC guidelines.213
Additionally, § 104(a)(2) discourages settlements because
settlement payments are susceptible to the same tax treatment as
trial awards.214 Furthermore, settlements often pose a financial
problem for employers, just as they pose a problem for
plaintiffs.215 Now that lawyers advise victims about the tax
consequences of settlement awards,216 victims often seek
increased monetary damages to compensate for the negative
financial burdens they face regarding income taxes.217 Employers
are discovering that they have to pay more than the plaintiffs
would have sought if § 104(a)(2) did not make the award
taxable.218 Businesses are further economically burdened by this
because Title VII provides that only employers may be liable for
sexual harassment, even when an individual employee committed
213

H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 pt. 1 (1991). In his report to Congress on the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congressman Ford of Michigan stated:
America is a better country because we as a people have moved
forward toward the goal of eradicating discrimination. Nowhere is
that more important than in the workplace. Of almost any sector of
American life, the progress toward equality has been greatest in the
workplace precisely because of strong federal equal employment
opportunity laws.
Id. By discouraging victims from utilizing the laws and guidelines put in place
by the federal government, Congress is contradicting the very purposes for
which those laws were enacted—to protect from evils of sex discrimination
that occur in the workplace. 146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18,
2000); see Wolff, supra note 13, at 1409 (examining the taxation of non
physical injuries against the backdrop of the progress of the civil rights
movement in the United States).
214
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003) (stating, “gross income does not
include . . . the amount of any damages . . . (whether by suit or
agreement) . . . on account of personal physical injuries or physical
sickness”); Coyle, supra note 136.
215
Coyle, supra note 136 (explaining that businesses are paying plaintiffs
for the negative tax burdens of their settlement awards).
216
See supra note 209 (quoting a lawyer advising client of tax burdens).
217
Coyle, supra note 136.
218
Id. (quoting attorneys David Chashdan and Frederick M. Gittes, who
stated that businesses have been paying more to individuals to cover tax
consequences).
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the harassment.219 Therefore, although the SBJPA was designed
to give tax breaks to small businesses, it may in fact create an
additional tax burden for businesses attempting to settle
employment discrimination cases.220
C. Section 104(a)(2) Denies the Reality of the Harms Caused
by Sexual Harassment
Victims of sexual harassment suffer a number of harms.221 As
a result, the scope of harm for which recovery is permitted in
sexual harassment cases is very broad.222 A victim may recover
for more than just emotional distress—she may also sue for
damages to reputation and career, loss of pride or self-respect,
loss of enjoyment in life or career, impact on family or close
friends and loss of community or social standing.223 The
availability of damages in sexual harassment cases “demonstrates
congressional recognition that discriminatory employment
practices inflict injuries beyond mere loss of paycheck or
219

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003); Coyle, supra note 136.
Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat.
1755 (1996); see infra Part II.C (discussing the SBJPA).
221
See LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE, supra note 45, at
447. Victims of sexual harassment may suffer from “stress, uncontrolled
anger, alienation, helplessness, fright, tension, nervousness, distress,
irritability, depression, persistent sadness, guilt, lability, anergia,
hyperenergia, mood swings, impulsivity, emotional flooding, anxiety, fear or
loss of control, escape fantasies, compulsive thoughts, rage episodes,
obsessional fears, crying spells, vulnerability, diminished self confidence, and
decreased self esteem and concentration.” Wolff, supra note 12, at 1457.
Victims may also experience psychiatric disorders such as depression or post
traumatic stress. Id. at 1458. In addition, these harms may lead to physical
conditions, such as heart disease, ulcers, headaches, insomnia, stomach
problems, weight loss, eating disorders and other chronic illnesses. Id. Sexual
harassment may also strain the victim’s relationships with friends and family.
Id.
222
LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE, supra note 45, at 447.
223
Id. at 447; H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 15 (1991). “Victims of
intentional discrimination often endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering
while on the job. This distress often manifests itself in emotional disorders and
medical problems.” Id.
220
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reduction in wage and benefits, and congressional intent that
victims of employment discrimination should be compensated for
those non-pecuniary injuries.”224
In light of the myriad harms caused by employment
discrimination and sexual harassment, it is difficult to understand
why Congress distinguished between those harms and others
caused by physical injuries.225 It appears that the government is
using the policy of disparate tax treatment of physical and nonphysical injury damage awards to insinuate that sex
discrimination is not as legitimate or serious an injury as a
physical assault.226 “A victim of discrimination suffers a
dehumanizing injury as real as, and often far more severe and
lasting harm than, a blow to the jaw.”227 Yet, the federal tax code
contradicts this statement by discriminating against those who are
already victims of sex discrimination and taxing them differently
224

Williams v. Pharmacia Opthalmics, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 791, 794
(N.D. Ind. 1996), aff’d, 137 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1998) (ruling that a sex
discrimination plaintiff’s compensatory damage award should be set at the
statutory maximum cap); see infra text accompanying note 50 (providing the
facts of the case); see also supra note 51 (discussing damage award caps
pursuant to Title VII).
225
See supra note 221 (explaining harms of sexual harassment). “It is
beyond question that discrimination in employment on the basis of sex . . . is,
as . . . this Court consistently has held, an invidious practice that causes grave
harm to its victims.” United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992).
“[T]he harms women and religious and racial minorities may suffer as a
consequence of the various types of intentional discrimination are the same.”
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1 (1991). See also Wolff, supra note 12, at 1464
(investigating the possibility of unconscious discrimination playing a part in
the taxation of employment discrimination damage awards).
226
See Brown, supra note 12, at 256-68 (highlighting the insinuation §
104(a) makes regarding the importance of job discrimination injuries); Wolff,
supra note 12, at 1485 (arguing that hidden prejudice is to blame for the
unreasonable distinction § 104(a) makes between physical and non-physical
injuries).
227
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d at 1221, 1232 (3d Cir.
1994). See also H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, (1991). (arguing for the
expansion of available remedies to victims of sex and race discrimination).
“[T]he principle of anti-discrimination is as important as the principle that
prohibits assaults, batteries and other intentional injuries to people.” Id.
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than victims of other damaging actions.228
Most importantly, the policy of § 104(a)(2) is not justifiable
in light of the progress this country has made since the Civil
Rights Act was first enacted in 1964.229 After years of hard work
and rallying against sex discrimination, victims of sexual
harassment and other forms of discrimination won the right to go
to court, prove that they have been victimized and receive
relief.230 Yet, by taxing the victims of sexual harassment, the
federal government invalidates the reality of those victims’
injuries.231
In addition, § 104(a)(2) penalizes women for falling victim to
sexual harassment in the first place.232 If the government seeks to
use the tax code as a social tool, making policy decisions about
the treatment of different societal injuries, it should conform its
tax provisions to the political goal of eliminating discrimination
in society.233 Yet, by forcing women to pay for pursuing sexual
228

26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003). The exception allowing medical
expenses for emotional distress to be excluded from income tax does not
overcome the insinuation that non-physical injuries are less personally harmful
than physical injuries. See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1480 Instead, it supports
that perception because it suggests that unless a victim seeks medical help for
his or her injuries, those injuries will not be regarded as “real.” Id.
229
See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1480 (concluding that victims of nonphysical injuries endure harms as severe as physical injuries and should
therefore receive the same tax treatment as victims of physical injuries); see
also Sager & Cohen, supra note 9 (stating that “the national commitment to
end unlawful discrimination is undermined when damages for the non-physical
injury of discrimination are taxed more heavily than damages for physical
harm”).
230
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2003); see supra Part
I.A (showing authority for victims to sue for sexual harassment in court); see
also Wolff, supra note 12, at 1484 (arguing that the progress of civil rights in
the U.S. led to a backlash causing the double discrimination of non-physical
injury victims).
231
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2).
232
146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000). “The result of the
[Small Business Protection Act of 1996] was to discriminate against people in
civil rights cases.” Id.
233
See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1486 n.1 (providing the history of
Congress using the Internal Revenue Code to make social policy decisions);
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harassment claims, the tax code re-victimizes the victims of
sexual harassment. Rather than compensating them for their
injuries at the expense of those liable for the harassment, §
104(a)(2) adds to the misfortune victims of sexual harassment
suffer.234
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND A SUGGESTION FOR THE
FUTURE
The negative consequences created by taxing sexual
harassment damage awards must be remedied in the legislature.235
Several solutions have been proposed, including one that
Congress is currently considering.236 This note suggests that the
solution best suited to address the negative tax treatment of
employment discrimination cases involves taxing defendants
rather than victims.
A. Civil Rights Tax Relief Act
A simple solution to the troubles of § 104(a) is for Congress
to reverse its 1996 amendment and eliminate the disparate tax
treatment of non-physical and physical injury damage awards.237
Congress is currently considering the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act
(CRTRA),238 which proposes to amend the tax code so that
damage awards for unlawful discrimination would not be
considered part of an individual’s gross income for tax
see also, 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2003) (providing for the ability to make tax
deductible charitable contributions).
234
146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000). “The result of this
taxation is that the attorneys and government make out better than the victims
who had their rights violated.” Id. See supra note 221 (describing harms
caused by sexual harassment).
235
146 CONG. REC. S7160-03, (July 18, 2000).
236
Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, H.R. 840, 107th Cong. (2001). The Civil
Rights Tax Relief Act was first introduced in 1998. Coyle, supra note 136.
The bill is supported by the House Way and Means Committee. Id.
237
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003).
238
H.R. 840.
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purposes.239 Therefore, damages received on account of sexual
harassment would receive the same treatment as physical injury
damage awards.240 In addition, although the amendment would
not allow exclusion of punitive damages or back-pay awards, it
would allow income averaging of back-pay awards so they would
no longer be taxed in lump sums.241 Pursuant to the amendment,
239

Id. The proposal would amend the tax code to state:
(a) In General.
(1) Exclusion. Gross income does not include amounts received
by a claimant (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump
sums or periodic payments) on account of a claim of unlawful
discrimination.
(2) Amounts covered. For purposes of paragraph (1), the term
‘amounts’ does not include—
(A) backpay or frontpay (as defined in section 1302(b)), or
(B) punitive damages.
Id. Many are advocating for the equal tax treatment of physical injury and
employment discrimination damage awards. See Brown, supra note 12, at 223
(arguing for the exclusion of damages for job bias recoveries); Coyle, supra
note 8; Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of
Employment Discrimination Recoveries under Federal Civil Rights Statutes:
Income from Human Capital, Realization, and NonRecognition, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 549 (1994) (arguing that based on the human capital approach, damage
awards for employment discrimination cases as well as physical injuries should
be excludable from income tax); Loiacono, supra note 2.
240
Supra note 239 (providing text of the proposed amendment).
241
H.R. 840; see also 146 CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000).
The tax code would be amended to read:
General Rule. If employment discrimination backpay or frontpay is
received by a taxpayer during a taxable year, the tax imposed by this
chapter for such taxable year shall not exceed the sum of—
(1) the tax which would be so imposed if—
(A) no amount of such backpay or frontpay were included in
gross income for such year, and
(B) no deduction were allowed for such year for expenses
(otherwise allowable as a deduction to the taxpayer for such
year) in connection with making or prosecuting any claim of
unlawful employment discrimination by or on behalf of the
taxpayer, plus
(2) the product of—
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back-pay awards would be taxed at the same rate as if the
individual were still employed.242 Finally, the bill attempts to
address the double taxation of attorneys’ fees by eliminating the
requirement that victims pay taxes on attorneys’ fees recovered in
successful lawsuits.243
The CRTRA is a good solution—it would ensure that the tax
treatment of damage awards in sexual harassment cases coincides
with the policy goals of Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination.244
(A) the number of years in the backpay period and frontpay
period, and
(B) the amount by which the tax determined under paragraph
(1) would increase if the amount on which such tax is
determined were increased by the average annual net
backpay and frontpay amount.
H.R. 840.
242
Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, H.R. 840, 107th Cong. (2001); 146
CONG. REC. S1760-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000). “The act provides for income
averaging of back-pay awards, making it possible for the award to be taxed
over the same number of years it was meant to compensate.” Id.
243
H.R. 840. See 146 CONG. REC. S7160-03, S1763 (July 18, 2000)
(stating that “this legislation ends the double taxation on attorney’s fees that
are awarded to a victim in a discrimination case”). In addition, on August 5,
2002, the mayor of Washington D.C. signed the nation’s first Civil Rights Tax
Fairness Act, which mirrors the bill currently pending in Congress. NELA
Applauds District’s Adoption of Nation’s First Civil Rights Tax Fairness Act;
Asks Congress to Follow, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 2, 2002, available at 2002
WL 22070164. Specifically, the new law amends the District of Columbia
Official Code to exclude from gross income amounts received on account of
unlawful discrimination and adds a new section to the tax code to allow the
income averaging of back-pay and front-pay awards received from
employment discrimination cases. Id. Although the local legislation does not
address the problem on a national level, it does offer hope of increasing
support for the passage of federal legislation. Id; see National Employment
Lawyers Association, HR 840/S 917, The Civil Rights Tax Relief Act: Tax
Equity for Targets of Discrimination, at http://www.nela.org/news/hr840/
endorsing.htm (last visited March 20, 2003) (providing a list of the current
endorsing organizations of the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, including such
organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, ABA Labor and Employment Section, and the American Small
Business Alliance).
244
H.R. 840. See generally Wolff, supra note 12, at 1343 (arguing that
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The equal tax treatment of physical injury and employment
discrimination damage awards would remove the suggestion that
the harms created by sexual harassment are less important than
the harms of physical injuries.245 Unlike an amendment that
would tax all damage awards flowing from all injuries, the
CRTRA ensures that victims are not re-victimized by the IRS.246
Nevertheless, there are several problems with the CRTRA.
First, in passing the bill, the federal government will lose the
revenue that it gained through the taxation of all non-physical
injury damage awards since the 1996 amendment.247 More
importantly, though, the CRTRA misses an important
opportunity to increase the negative consequences to employers
the equal treatment of physical and non-physical injuries would be more in line
with the recognition that non-physical injuries can be as harmful to victims as
physical injuries).
245
See supra Part III.C (arguing that the tax distinction between physical
and non-physical injuries insinuates that victims of non-physical injuries, such
as sexual harassment, do not suffer real injuries).
246
See Mark W. Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be
Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43, 51-52 (1987) (arguing that a tax
exclusion for personal injury damage awards is inconsistent with the
fundamentals of the tax code); Lawrence A. Frolick, Personal Injury
Compensation as a Tax Preference, 37 ME. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1985)
(asserting that the exclusion from gross income for personal injury awards
should be eliminated in order to increase tax revenue).
247
See supra note 137 (stating that the government has already received
millions in revenue from the creation of the § 104(a)(2) amendment). Some
have advocated for an amendment that would make all damage awards, for
both physical and non-physical injuries, excludable. See, e.g., H.R. 2802,
105th Cong. (1997); see Buchan, supra note 93, at 11 (discussing the bill as a
means to restore the tax exclusion for non-physical injuries). Although this
type of solution would ensure against any unreasonable distinctions made
between different types of physical and non-physical injuries, this solution
would result in a substantial loss in revenue. In this way, the Civil Rights Tax
Relief Act has been viewed by some as the “middle road” because rather than
providing for the equal treatment of all physical and non-physical injuries, the
Civil Rights Tax Relief Act would provide for the equal treatment of physical
injury and employment discrimination damages. See Buchan, supra note 93, at
11 (describing the bill suggested by Rep. Gerald Solomon, who proposed that
the damage exclusion be applied to employment discrimination awards, but not
all non-physical injury damage awards).
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found liable for sexual harassment.248 This is especially true
because many tortfeasors are already allowed to declare payments
to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases as income tax
deductions.249 Therefore, although the CRTRA would entitle
discrimination victims to equal tax treatment, Congress would
still be allowing employers to deduct employment discrimination
damage payments for income tax purposes.250
B. A Solution for the Future: Taxing the Defendants, Not the
Victims
A better solution would be one that uses the tax code as a
social policy tool to support the goals of Title VII and the EEOC
guidelines to eliminate employment discrimination, while still
providing the revenue that the taxation of non-physical injury
damage awards currently provide through § 104(a).251 A statutory
requirement that defendant employers compensate plaintiffs for
the negative tax consequences they suffer when they are awarded
compensatory damage awards or attorneys’ fees would satisfy
both the victims and the government.252 This solution would keep
§ 104(a) as it stands, requiring the taxation of damage awards in
employment discrimination cases.253 Instead of changing §
104(a), Congress should adopt a law stating that employers found
liable for harassment are required to pay successful plaintiffs for
248

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003); see infra Part I.B (discussing the types of
liability employers are exposed to for sexual harassment).
249
See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1486 (arguing that the income tax
deduction allowed for payments made by the tortfeasor should be eliminated in
order to eliminate the inequalities of § 104(a)(2) while still providing financial
revenue for the government).
250
Id. See Wolff, supra note 12, at 1486 (calling for the elimination of
the business expense allowance for payments to victims of employment
discrimination).
251
See supra note 137 (stating the estimated revenue from this tax
provision).
252
26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2003); See supra note 137 (stating the
government’s revenue return on § 104(a)); supra Part III.B (discussing
negative financial effects of § 104(a) on successful plaintiffs).
253
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2).
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the negative tax consequences posed by § 104(a)(2).254 Imposing
such a requirement would use § 104(a) to burden parties
responsible for perpetuating harassment rather than victims who
are already harmed.255
Some courts have attempted to implement this solution by
requiring defendant’s to pay plaintiffs for the negative tax
consequences of damage awards.256 For instance, the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania attempted to do so in a recent age
discrimination case.257 In O’Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the
254

See infra Part III.B (discussing negative tax consequences of § 104(a));
see also Wolff, supra note 12, at 1486 (advocating the equal treatment of
physical and non-physical injuries). Wolff advocates eliminating the taxation
of non-physical injuries as well as eliminating the business expense allowance
for payments to victims of employment discrimination. Id. This note’s
proposal differs because it would keep § 104(a) the way it is—it would
maintain the distinction between physical and non-physical injury damages.
However, this note suggests adding a federal law that requires that the tax
consequences posed to employment discrimination plaintiffs by § 104(a)(2) be
paid by the employers found liable. Employers should have to reimburse the
plaintiffs the negative consequences without declaring the tax payments as
business expenses.
255
See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234-35 (3d
Cir. 1994) (stating that one purpose of anti-discrimination laws is to increase
the burdens on employers held liable for the discrimination, so as to deter
employment discrimination).
256
O’Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (awarding plaintiff additional damages for tax consequences of lump
sum back-pay award); Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, 55 P.3d 1208 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (awarding plaintiff
supplemental award to compensate for negative tax consequences caused by
attorneys’ fee and back-pay award in sex discrimination case). See also EEOC
v. Joe’s Stone Crab Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (ruling
that a district court may award an additional damage award for negative tax
consequences posed by a lump sum back-pay award, but declining to do so in
that particular case because there was insufficient evidence to make
appropriate tax calculations).
257
O’Neill, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 446. The plaintiff had sued his former
employer for the premature termination of his job, alleging that he had been
terminated in willful contravention of the ADEA. Id. at 443. The plaintiff was
awarded both back pay and front pay in a lump sum, rather than over a period
of years, equal to what the plaintiff would have worked if he had not been
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district court found the plaintiff entitled to receive money to
cover the negative tax burdens in relation to his back pay and
front pay because had he kept his employment, he would have
received his salary over a number of years.258 The court reasoned
that an award for the negative tax consequences, endured as a
result of bringing an employment discrimination suit, was
necessary to meet the goal of making the plaintiff “whole.”259
Therefore, the court awarded him the difference between his tax
liability for the back-pay and front-pay awards received in the
lawsuit and the amount he would have owed in taxes had he
received the money as wages.260
A Washington court of appeals has also recently taken the
initiative to allow a plaintiff to receive a supplemental damage
award for negative tax consequences.261 The plaintiff, Ms.
Blaney, was awarded $638,764 in damages and $235,625.38 in
attorneys’ fees for winning her sex discrimination case based on a
Washington state anti-discrimination statute.262 At trial, Ms.
terminated. Id. at 444. The plaintiff requested that the court add an award for
the negative tax consequences posed by these awards. Id. at 446.
258
Id.
259
Id.; Susan Kalinka, O’Neil v. Sears, Roebuck and Co: Award of
Damages for Increased Tax Liability, 79 TAXES 45, Jan 1. 2001, available at
2001 WL8812786. The court also thought it was particularly important to
award the plaintiff recovery for the negative tax consequences of his lump sum
front-pay award because his front-pay award had already been reduced to
present value. O’Neill, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 447. Therefore, the presumption
was that he would invest the money and receive a return equal to his lost
wages; however, the negative tax consequences of his award would leave him
with less money to invest. Id. at 447.
260
Id. at 449. Mr. O’Neill’s tax liability after the lawsuit was
$67,164.96. Id. at 448. This was $38,780.05 more than what he would have
owed had he been paid wages. Id. Therefore, the court awarded him
$38,780.05 in addition to his back-pay and front-pay award of $237,332. Id.
The court did not consider the negative tax consequences posed by the
compensatory and liquidated damages the plaintiff had been awarded, in the
amount of $281,736. Id. at 448. It only compensated the plaintiff for the
consequences posed by the lump sum wages award. Id.
261
Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 55 P.3d
1208 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
262
Id. at 1210; Washington Law Against Discrimination, WASH. REV.
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Blaney presented the testimony of a certified public accountant
who stated that she would owe $244,753 in taxes as a result of
her damage awards.263 To determine whether Ms. Blaney was
entitled to compensation for the negative tax consequences, the
court of appeals interpreted the anti-discrimination statute’s
provision allowing the award of “actual damages.”264 The court
construed “actual damages” to include a supplemental payment to
“offset the adverse federal tax consequences to her from the . . .
lump sum payment of the judgments on the damages award and
attorney fees against it.”265 Therefore, the court remanded the
case to determine the amount Ms. Blaney should be awarded for
the negative tax consequences.266
Similarly, parties negotiating settlement agreements have also
tried to implement this type of solution by agreeing that the
employers make increased settlement payments to cover the
negative tax consequences posed to the victims.267 During many
recent sexual harassment settlement discussions, employers have
discovered that they have to pay extra money to compensate
plaintiffs for the taxes that will have to be paid on the settlement
payments.268 Employers who normally want to settle cases are
instead finding that they are in a better position if they go to trial
where plaintiffs cannot request compensation for negative tax
consequences.269 If there were a statutory requirement that
employers compensate plaintiffs for negative tax consequences

CODE 49.60.030(2) (2003).
263
Blaney, 55 P.3d at 1210.
264
WASH. REV. CODE 49.60.030(2); see Blaney, 55 P.3d at 1215
(quoting the Washington statute).
265
Blaney, 55 P. 3d at 1214. The court further stated that its ruling made
practical sense because forcing plaintiffs to pay the taxes would “threaten to
thwart meritorious suits because a highly successful plaintiff runs the risk of
having the entire benefit of a judgment eliminated plus incurring a substantial
tax liability to the Internal Revenue Service.” Id. at 1217.
266
Id. at 1218. The court stated that on remand, the burden would be on
Ms. Blaney to demonstrate the negative tax consequences. Id.
267
Coyle, supra note 136.
268
Id.
269
See id.
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both in court and through out of court settlements, however,
employers would no longer be able to use trial to avoid the tax
payments.270 This would decrease the burden on the courts by
allowing more cases to settle.271
This type of solution is particularly productive because
victims of sexual harassment would no longer bear the financial
burden of being successful in court.272 Compensating successful
plaintiffs for negative tax consequences caused by § 104(a) will
reduce the disincentives in place for victims of harassment to
bring lawsuits to vindicate their civil rights.273 Women would no
longer face the uncertainty of the tax consequences of their
lawsuits. Instead, they would know that if they win, their
employers would reimburse them for whatever taxes they may
have to pay on their monetary damages.274
Moreover, this solution is unique in that it creates an added
incentive for employers to take measures to prevent sexual
harassment in their workplaces.275 Requiring employers to pay
270

Coyle, supra note 136. “Because of the tax bite, businesses have to
pay more or individuals have to take less to get settlements, or there are no
settlements. A lot of cases are on the docket longer, and there are more
trials.” Id. (quoting lawyer Frederick M. Gittes, partner at Spater, Gittes,
Schulte & Kolman, of Columbus Ohio).
271
Id. Advocates of the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act also state that its
passage would reduce the burden on courts. Coyle, supra note 8. “If the IRS
takes less in taxes from civil rights plaintiffs’ settlements, it will be easier for
both civil rights plaintiffs and defendant businesses to reach just settlements
without the need for protracted trials requiring significant investment of
resources.” Id. (quoting Rep. Deborah Pryce, who supported the Civil Rights
Tax Relief Act).
272
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003).
273
Id.; Blaney v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 55
P.3d 1208, 1217 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that forcing plaintiffs to pay
the negative tax consequences will “thwart” meritorious claims from coming
forward); see supra Part III (discussing the disincentives to bringing lawsuits
for sexual harassment).
274
§ 104(a); see supra Part II.C, D (discussing the taxation of damage
and attorneys’ fee awards in non-physical injury cases).
275
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2003).
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment.
An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual
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plaintiffs for negative tax burdens will increase financial
consequences on employers, which in turn will encourage
employers to avoid liability by implementing preventative
programs and taking strong positions against sexual
harassment.276 Therefore, this solution furthers the goal of Title
VII to eliminate discrimination in society.277 In addition, by
maintaining the taxation of employment discrimination damage
and settlement awards, the government will still receive the
revenue it gained by implementing § 104(a)(2) in the first
place.278 Only this time, the government will receive its tax
revenue from the blameworthy parties, not the victims.279
CONCLUSION
The federal government has a legitimate and important goal
of eliminating the evils of sexual harassment and sex
discrimination from society. Through the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1991, Congress attempted to discourage sexual
harassment and compensate victims for the considerable harms
they may suffer by allowing them to sue for relief under Title

harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject,
expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions,
informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue
of harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all
concerned.
Id.
276

Id. “Congress prescribed a strong medicine, the anti-employment
discrimination laws, to cure the social malady of invidious discrimination.
Deterrence is accomplished by placing an economic price on discriminatory
acts, and stigmatizing the wrongdoer’s acts before the entire community.”
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234-35 (3d Cir. 1994).
277
See supra Part I.A (discussing the function of Title VII and the EEOC
in eliminating sex discrimination in employment).
278
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2003); see supra note
137 (describing the taxation of non-physical injuries as a means of raising
revenue).
279
See supra Part III (discussing the negative effects imposed by taxing
the victims of sexual harassment).
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VII.280 Only five years after providing victims of harassment with
a variety of compensatory damages to recover in lawsuits,
Congress contradicted itself by taxing employment discrimination
victims through § 104(a)(2).281 It is already socially undesirable
to bring allegations against those guilty of sexual harassment, and
now the government has made it financially undesirable by
requiring attorneys’ fees and compensatory damage awards based
on non-physical injuries to be subject to income taxation.282 In
doing so, victims are subject to double discrimination and are
told that their injuries are not “real.” Until Congress passes a law
requiring those liable for sexual harassment to pay plaintiffs for
tax consequences created by § 104(a)(2), the government will be
using the tax code to perpetuate the damaging practice of sex
discrimination and sexual harassment throughout society.

280

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2003).
26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2003).
282
See supra text accompanying note 208-09 (discussing the undesirability
of bringing lawsuits under Title VII for sexual harassment due to the negative
financial consequences posed by Section 104(a)(2)).
281

